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ABSTRACT 
Henderson, Jonathon Case. M. Hum., Master of Humanities Program, Wright State 
University, 2010. Imam, Shah, and Ayatollah: Charismatic Leadership in the Shi’i 
Tradition, and its Role in Iran’s Shi’ite Revolutions. 
This thesis examines the role of charismatic religious leadership in Iran’s two Shi’ite 
revolutions. Included within the larger arguments of this work, are sections addressing 
the scholastic categorizations of charisma, the development of the Shi’i Islamic tradition, 
and they way in which the charisma of the was appropriated by later Shi’i figures to bring 
about social, political, and religious revolutions in Iran. For this work, Shah Isma’il ibn 
Haydar and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini serve as examples of charismatic Shi’i figures 
that drew upon the suspended charisma of the Shi’i Imams. This work also briefly 
comments on events in contemporary Iran in order to provide insight into the future of 
revolutionary Iran. 
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I. INTRODUCTION, CHARISMA, AND THE ISLAMIC HISTORICAL TRADITION 
Revolutions make understandably popular research topics. Iran, for example, has 
received a great deal of scholastic attention thanks to the relatively recent Islamic 
Revolution, which resulted in the creation of a government headed by the religious 
establishment. While there are many different studies of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, there 
are few that take into account the uniqueness of Iranian religious history. Moreover, 
studies of the Islamic Revolution tend to concentrate only on historical and religious 
developments during the twentieth century and providing only fleeting mention (if at all) 
of events that precede the contemporary. This work will seek to avoid such pitfalls by 
using charismatic leadership as a unifying factor to investigate Shi’i Iran. The purpose of 
this work will be to establish the charismatic nature of the Shi’i Imamate and to 
demonstrate how the Imam’s charisma, due to the belief in the occultation of the Twelfth 
Shi’i Imam, was appropriated and transformed by Shah Isma’il ibn Haydar (1487-1524) 
and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) in order to facilitate Iran’s Shi’ite 
Revolutions in 1501 and 1979 respectively. 
An account of the 1979 Islamic Revolution from Iranian Sattareh Farman 
Farmaian helps to provide some context to the nature of this study. Farman Farmaian 
describes the message of Ayatollah Khomeini in the years leading up to Iran’s Islamic 
revolution as simultaneously “powerful” and “impressive,” but also “disturbing” (294). 
What Farman Farmaian found so alarming about Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric was 
his willingness to condemn and destroy everything the Shah’s regime had built, while 
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making only vague references to what sort of social reforms and institutions would arise 
once the Shah was gone (294). Evan so, Farman Farmaian was not too alarmed as she, 
like most Iranians (and most of the world for that matter) felt that is was unlikely that the 
Shah with his large, well-equipped, and American-supported army and would ever fall 
(290). Yet, by February of 1979 the Shah was gone and his army was in shambles with 
its members either defecting or swearing allegiance to the new revolutionary government 
and its revolutionary leader: Ayatollah Khomeini (Arjomand, The Turban 136). 
Khomeini’s return to Iran from exile marked the culmination of massive street 
demonstrations by people from all levels of Iran’s society, who had thrown their support 
behind Khomeini’s message and stood up against the Shah, even though in doing so they 
often put their lives and livelihoods at risk (Garthwaite 254-255). 
Said Amir Arjomand views the “seeds” of the “revolutionary transformation” in 
Iran as being rooted in the Shi’ite Islamic tradition (“History, Structure” 112). In 
Arjomand’s mind, Shi’ite or Shi’i Islam has “considerable transformative potential” upon 
which Khomeini drew during the Islamic Revolution (“History, Structure” 112). With 
Khomeini’s authority the people of Iran, at great risk to themselves and families, forced 
the Shah to permanently abandon Iran. Even the Shah’s army and his elite “Immortal” 
corps were ultimately no match for Khomeini armed only with a broadcast microphone 
(Farman Farmaian 299). Khomeini’s revolution in Iran suggests what Thomas E. Dow, 
in commenting on the work of sociologist Max Weber, describes as “a specifically 
revolutionary force” in which people are freed from “custom, law and tradition” and 
“overturn all notions of sanctity” (83). The “force” behind the behavior that Dow 
describes, and the possible drive for the Islamic revolution, is charismatic authority. 
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Charisma and charismatic authority are, by their nature, somewhat nebulous 
terms-often escaping definition or simply applied as an adjective to a popular or 
successful individual. Some may even argue that any attempt to analyze charisma “run[s] 
the risk of stilling the drama into lifelessness” (Willis xi). In order to combat such 
ambiguity, this work will draw almost exclusively from the definitions of charisma 
presented in the scholarship of Max Weber. Sociologist and scholar Max Weber 
dedicated a fair amount of his writings to defining and demystifying charisma and 
charismatic authority (Lindholm, Charisma 23). In addition to the works of Weber, 
scholarship that builds on Weber’s theories of charisma, particularly in regard to 
charisma’s revolutionary potential, will be explored and briefly reviewed. 
Weber states that charismatic leaders, or holders of charismatic authority are in 
possession “of specific gifts of the body and spirit” which are “believed to be 
supernatural, [and] not accessible to everybody” (19). Weber further defines charisma, 
albeit with a degree of Christian shading, as “the gift of grace” (47). Weber further 
associates the ability to reach various states of ecstasy, revelation, and berserker rage 
with charisma, and as part of a charismatic individual’s “gifts” (19). Dow observes that 
by linking charisma with certain states such as ecstasy “the elemental and daemonic 
character” of charisma is revealed, thus establishing a trend in which charisma is 
associated with states “beyond reason and self-control” (84). Following his assertions of 
charisma as an elemental, reasonless force Dow elaborates on his theories citing the 
“Dionysian” character of charisma (84). For Dow, Weber’s “gift of grace” is more 
correctly characterized as “grace of divinity divested of morality” (84). The point that 
Dow makes in his analysis of Weber’s characterizations is that charisma is a significant 
Henderson 4 
and powerful force, but its character is distinctly “elemental not ethical” (Dow 85). For 
an example of his view of charisma, Dow presents lightning with all of its “caprice or 
carelessness” as an apt metaphor for “elemental” charisma (Dow 85). John Ralph Willis 
adds that, “a feeling for the irrational is an almost infallible touchstone of the charismatic 
sense” (xi). 
Expanding on Weber’s definitions of charismatic authority are a number of 
scholars who help to clarify, and in some cases, critique the works of Weber, creating a 
greater understanding of charisma. Douglas F. Barnes makes the important distinction 
between a charismatic individual and an individual who possesses charismatic authority. 
For Barnes, individuals can be said to have charismatic authority only when they attract 
followers based on their charismatic gifts (2). In some ways, Barnes’ argument differs 
slightly from Weber’s own conception of a charismatic leader’s relationship to his/her 
followers, who he viewed as being more independent from the “attitudes of the masses” 
(Weber 49). Nonetheless, taking followers into account adds a social dynamic to 
charisma that separates it from the skills or talents that make an individual charismatic, or 
as Weber puts it, “it is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is 
decisive for the validity of charisma” (49). In more practical terms, Weber views the 
merits of “personal charisma” as the “original basis of recruitment” in any group in which 
charisma is revealed through the relationship between the charismatic leader and their 
followers (58). In many ways, Weber’s explanation of charisma showcases the volatile 
and fickle nature of the “gift of grace” (47). Weber writes that charisma, “by its very 
nature” is “unstable” and can easily be lost if it is not properly sustained (22). 
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Charismatic authority in the Weberian sense is authority that is derived from an 
“individual person” that inspires loyalty through the exercise of their special gifts (46-
47). Willis’ analysis of the effect of a charismatic Sufi Shaykh displays his Weberian 
point of view when he writes about the effect of the Shaykh on his followers (152). For 
Willis, the Shaykh’s followers “were drawn not by the average but by the extreme 
instance of every phase of life he touched” (152). Willis’ statement certainly indicates 
the importance of the follower who reciprocates the leader’s charismatic touch with 
loyalty, however, that relationship would not exist if not for the uncommon ability of the 
Shaykh. If, for whatever reason, the gifts that have bestowed charisma on a specific 
individual are lost, then the followers of said individual (Weber’s validating factor) will 
fade away. 
Weber’s concept of charisma is also viewed as a result of the symbiotic 
relationship between an exceptional individual and those who support them. Jack T. 
Sanders, in his analysis of the charismatic nature of Jesus, attests to the importance of the 
relationship between a charismatic leader and his or her followers writing that it is “the 
phenomenon of following Jesus that we want to examine” in order to understand his 
charisma (11). From Sanders point of view, a leader is only charismatic from the point of 
view of his followers adding, “the high priest Caiaphas, for example, would hardly have 
described Jesus as a charismatic leader” (26). Presenting a similar opinion without 
referencing a specific tradition, Charles Lindholm characterizes Weber’s theories on 
charisma as an extension of his sociological outlook, since Weber discussed not just the 
outlook of one “genius as an outsider,” but the relationship between a charismatic leader 
and his or her followers (Charisma 25). In seeing the communal ties that charisma can 
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create, Weber distinguished himself from thinkers like Nietzsche and Mill who thought 
that the gifts of charisma often led to a charismatic individual’s rejection from groups of 
individuals rather than their inclusion (Lindholm Charisma 25). Robert Tucker goes even 
further, suggesting that a charismatic leader and his or her followers are one entity or a 
charismatic “phenomenon” (qtd. in Sanders 26). Despite Tucker’s argument, Sanders, 
like Weber, is quick to point out that while the followers of a charismatic leader provide 
them a source of social and political strength, those same followers “do not randomly 
simply put someone up as the embodiment of their hopes” (27). 
While Weber did not necessarily see followers as vital to the maintenance and 
acquisition of charismatic authority, he does view the role of followers as an 
authenticating factor. According to Dow, Weber felt that followers were needed for the 
“application of personal values” to an otherwise unrestrained force (85). Likewise, it is 
possible that through the loss of followers, or the failure to “perform” or meet the 
expectations of charismatic authority, than that power can be lost (Weber 23, 49). In 
Weber’s own words, “if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his 
charismatic authority with disappear” (50). 
Lindholm does contend, however, that while Weber’s definition of charisma has a 
social character, charisma “in its primal form…does not have any fixed lines of 
authority” (Charisma 25). For Barnes, it is the relationship, or social character, that 
develops between a charismatic leader and their followers serve to contain or limit the 
primal charisma (2). Lindholm’s analysis of the volatile nature of primal or “pure” 
charisma does hint at the activist potential of charisma, in a way that, at least to 
Lindholm, Weber’s analysis does not (Charisma 24). Lindholm feels that Weber dwells 
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too much on charisma as legitimizing factor within a rational framework (Charisma 24). 
This is not to say that Lindholm feels that Weber ignores “primal” charisma, but merely 
that Weber does not devote enough space to the volatile nature of primal charisma 
(Lindholm, Charisma 25). In Weber’s defense, devoting too much time and analysis to 
understanding primal charisma, because of its revolutionary and irrational character, is 
hard to document. Furthermore, most charismatic events in history work within some 
sort of societal framework making “pure” or “primal” charisma in these events hard to 
quantify. Lindholm, however, proves to be quite capable of explaining the intricacies of 
primal charisma, noting “charisma of this type is revolutionary and creative, occurring in 
times of social crisis, opening the way to a new future” (Charisma 25). Barnes echoes 
Lindholm’s sentiment saying “a period of radical social change which causes distress and 
dissatisfaction among a segment of the population” often creates a fertile “environment” 
for the rise of charismatic leader (4). 
Going further to emphasize the importance of a chaotic socio-political environment 
to the advent of a charismatic leader, Barnes states that “without proper social conditions 
the society would regard the potential leader as an eccentric getting excited over nothing” 
(4). Tucker, like Barnes and Lindholm, also links times of distress with the rise of 
charismatic leaders noting that charismatic authority is often recognized by followers 
who turn to a leader who is “peculiarly qualified to lead them out of their predicament” 
(qtd. in Sanders 27). Sanders, for example, presents dissatisfaction with leadership and 
high taxes contributing to social and political unease, as one possible explanation for the 
rise of Jesus (51-53). Barnes, Lindholm, and Tucker in adding a revolutionary subtext to 
Weber’s theories on charisma, are adding aspects that were not developed by Weber 
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himself, who did not see the rise of charismatic leaders as “revolutionary in the socio-
political sense” (Sanders 25). Sanders does note, however, that despite Weber’s 
intentions, much of the commentary on his work has taken on a revolutionary overtone 
(25). It is also important to point out that Weber acknowledges the “unpredictable nature 
of charismatic leadership” and describes charismatic authority as “sharply opposed both 
to rational, and particularly bureaucratic, authority” (53). Although Weber does not 
describe charismatic authority as being particularly reactive to the status quo he, 
nevertheless, admits that the “rational” and “bureaucratic” elements of society may be 
strained by a charismatic event (53). 
Dow comes to conclusions similar to those of Barnes and Lindholm in that he sees 
charismatic authority as “a pattern of psychological, social, and economic release” (83). 
What Dow means by the “release” granted by charismatic authority refers once again to 
the relationship between a charismatic individual and those who follow them, in which 
the charismatic leader’s followers are freed from of “custom, law ordinary worldly 
attachments” (83). Dow further notes, however, that while Weber’s initial formulations 
on pure or primal charisma acknowledge the “irresponsible release” that is innately found 
in such charismatic activity, he later denounced such behavior (90). Instead, Weber 
began to see charisma in terms of a “charismatic ethic” seen in terms of an assessment for 
“personal and social development” (Dow 91). Dow views Weber’s early theories of the 
revolutionary charisma as being “at odds” with his later conception of charisma as a 
“model of personal and social development” (91). Neither Dow nor Weber provide 
sufficient definitions of “social development” so it is hard not to view certain 
revolutionary or reactive behavior as falling under the umbrella of “social development” 
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(Dow 91). In terms of a “charismatic ethic,” it is easier to quantify what Weber might 
mean by investigating his views and scholarship on the role of charisma in religion. 
The historical role of certain religious figures is something that is often hard to 
establish. Arjomand, for example, in an article that discuses revolutions in Shi’i Iran, 
indicates the “inadequacy” of the more traditional explanations for certain political 
behavior that presents upheaval as a “mere” consequence of society (“History, Structure” 
111). Arjomard feels that many revolutionary movements are often presented without a 
proper understanding of the history and culture of the region (“History, Structure” 111). 
Looking at all aspects of a society and culture including religion are significant, as 
religious history can transcend any one society. Using Weber’s conception of 
charismatic religious leadership as a linking factor allows for a more comprehensive 
analysis that avoids the pitfalls that Arjomard describes. Nevertheless, certain 
conventional components of a society or culture cannot be completely overlooked, and 
provide salient counterpoint to the wider arguments of this work. 
S.N. Eisenstadt, an editor of Weber’s work, acknowledges that religion in particular 
“is prone to the manifestations of charismatic creativity and innovation” (qtd. in Weber 
252). Weber’s sociological analysis of prophethood and charismatic religious leadership, 
much like his categorization of charisma itself, does not completely encapsulate all 
aspects of the charismatic and the religious; it nevertheless, serves as an appropriate 
starting point. Weber’s classic definition of a prophet links many of his more general 
theories on charisma, tying them together toward a more cohesive end. The prophet as 
revealed by Weber is an “individual bearer of charisma” who is able to successfully 
convey “a religious doctrine or divine commandment” thanks to the individual’s special 
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gifts (253). Once again, Weber places emphasis on the singular, individual nature of the 
charismatic prophet figure. Weber’s definition of the prophet also contains specific 
references to the talents of a prophet, the first and foremost being some sort of divine 
connection (258). Prophets must also able to successfully communicate the message of 
their revelations, implying the need for a certain degree of physical and mental ability, to 
aid in what Weber calls “vital emotional preaching” (260). For Weber, it is the prophet’s 
charisma that differentiates them from religious functionaries or nobility (254). Prophets 
are also able to profess “definite revelations,” and are on an inspired mission to deliver 
these revelations in the form of a message (Weber 254). 
Weber states that there are two distinct incarnations of the prophet figure (263). 
One form is represented “with especial clarity by Zoroaster and Muhammad,” who 
epitomize the role of the “ethical prophet” (Weber 263). Buddha represents the second 
form of the prophet, which Weber defines as a world-rejecting, personal salvation 
oriented prophet who serves as the consummate example for their followers (263). The 
ethical prophet, according to Weber, serves as an “instrument for the proclamation of a 
god and his will,” and outlines a defined program of obligations in order for their 
followers to adhere to the message of the leader’s revelations (263). The delineated 
nature of the ethical prophet’s message lends itself to a more resolute application in 
society free from “concrete historical influences” (Weber 266). 
While Weber’s use of Zoroaster and Muhammad as examples of ethical prophets 
are fitting concerning the scope of this work, it is still helpful to look at the some 
scholarship on other prophetic figures in order to provide context to distinctly Iranian and 
Islamic elements. In Sander’s analysis of the charismatic authority of Jesus a few salient 
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points to a general discussion of religious leadership are presented. One example 
concerns the “call” or message of Jesus, which, according to Sanders, is accepted by most 
researchers of the New Testament to have been “one consistent, coherent complex of 
ideas” (37). Sanders notes that while Jesus may have had such a defined message, “he 
failed to convey it to his followers” (37). What Sanders means by Jesus’ inability to 
communicate a message is that Jesus’ message was new enough, and different enough 
from existing traditions that his followers could not completely assemble his message 
without the aid of Jesus (37). Jesus’ ambiguity existed because he had no distinct 
“models” in the “Hebrew prophets” or the various “messianic revolutionaries” that were 
familiar to the people of his time (Sanders 71). Sanders does, however, concede some 
points after referencing some recent scholarship by Robert Stark (71). In the case of 
Muhammad and Jesus in particular, Stark indentifies the relevance of a “supportive 
cultural tradition” in the influence and “receipt of [their] revelations” (qtd. in Sanders 
71). The guesswork involved in the creation of a new religious movement (Christianity 
in this case) adds to an aura of randomness that surrounds charismatic leaders (Sanders 
54). According to Sanders, “doing the unexpected is a key device of the charismatic 
leader of a new religious movement,” and can actually be used to amplify charisma (54). 
In the case of Jesus, Sanders references “a group of problem sayings” to illustrate his 
randomness (55). 
Muhammad, as argued by Liyakat N. Takim, “bears the hallmarks of Weber’s 
characterization of charismatic authority,” as he challenged the existing social 
organizations based on a “belief in [a] divinely appointed mission” (3-4). Furthermore, 
Muhammad was the bearer of an ethical message building on the traditions “of the great 
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biblical prophets” (Takim 3-4). From Takim’s perspective, Muhammad, unlike Jesus, 
fully acknowledged and embraced the Abrahamic-Judaic prophetic lineage that existed in 
his day (4). Moreover, Muhammad, through his revelations from God, was able to 
provide the young Muslim community with the Qur’an, which “replaced traditional tribal 
authority with a new ethical-moral structure that negated the old normative order” (Takim 
4). In building on the image of previous prophets and delivering the Qur’an, Muhammad 
is presented as anything but random. The way in which Muhammad established a 
community in Medina with precise “moral and his social reforms” provides additional 
support for the clarity of his prophetic purpose (Armstrong 105). Furthermore, 
Muhammad is perceived by Muslims to have been nearly infallible, his actions having 
attained a level of reverence that can hardly be categorized as arbitrary (Lapidus 30). 
At the societal level, Muhammad’s charisma and its effect on his followers are even 
more apparent. In her biography of the prophet, Karen Armstrong describes the hijrah, 
or the migration of the early Muslim community from Mecca to nearby Yathrib (later 
renamed Medina), as a sacrilegious action to the tribally oriented Arabians (97). 
According to Armstrong, the early Muslims break from the tribal system “was far more 
shocking than the Qur’anic rejection of the goddesses” (97). Even the word hijrah, when 
broken down to its roots, implies a painful process involving the severing of ties to an 
adoring community (Armstrong 97). Moreover, when the Meccan Muslims arrived in 
Yathrib they would be considered “zalim (outsider) a word which carried” a number of 
implications in Arabic ranging from “base” to “evil” (Armstrong 97). The fact the 
Muhammad was able to uproot a portion of Mecca’s population and have them break the 
tribal ties that had in essence defined their entire lives lends some credence to Dow’s 
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tradition-breaking notions of charismatic authority (83). Muhammad’s abilities express 
what Weber calls “charismatic dominance” in which “ties to any external order” are cut 
and ultimately replaced with the message and “mentality of the prophet” (Weber 24). 
Zoroastrianism, the religion of most pre-Islamic Iranians, offers a few relevant 
charismatic developments that endured the Islamic conquest and subsequent conversion 
of Iran. The prophet Zoroaster is believed to have begun his religious mission around 
1100 B.C., and is thought to have been an agent of significant religious change 
(Garthwaite 62). Zoroaster’s doctrine professes faith in Ahura Mazda as the “paramount 
god of the cosmos,” thus injecting hints of monotheism into a world that was generally 
polytheistic (Garthwaite 62). According to Zoroastrian tradition, Ahura Mazda is locked 
in a cosmic struggle with Ahriman the personification of darkness and the evil forces of 
the world (Garthwaite 62, 96). Moreover, the cosmic struggle that Zoroaster revealed 
contains many eschatological parables in which the forces of good ultimately triumph 
over the forces of evil in an apocalyptic scenario (Garthwaite 93). 
Although Zoroastrianism may not appear to be directly related to aspects of 
charisma beyond the mention of Zoroaster in Weber’s work, it does however have a 
strong connection to a distinctly Iranian conception of charisma that continued into 
Islamic times. In the ancient Iranian tradition, it is believed that the right rule was 
directly bestowed by Ahura Mazda, creating a “golden radiance which can be perceived 
in a victor or a powerful, successful king” (Von Stietencron 19-20). In Old Persian the 
term for the charismatic aura of the ancient Iranian kings and champions is know as 
khavarnah, or in modern Persian, as farr (Garthwaite 56). Farr, like Weber’s definition 
of charisma, is something that sets the individual apart, a “nimbus symbolizing Divine 
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favor” (Ferdowsi 7). Farr is also an aura that is apparent to any subject or follower in 
sight of one who possess farr, as Persianist Rueben Levy notes in his commentary of the 
Shahnama (The Persian Epic of Kings), farr “was recognized by beholders and implied 
infallible greatness and good fortune as its possessor held the favour of the Divine 
powers” (qtd. in Ferdowsi 7). 
Farr, because of its divine origins, serves as a nearly literal Iranian equivalent to 
Weber’s conception of charisma as a “gift of grace” (47). Heinrich Von Stietencron 
observes in the Indo-Iranian “literary tradition” that farr is often intimately linked to 
kingship (18). Weber also saw the link between charisma and the development kingship 
writing, “kingship evolves from charismatic heroism” (25). In citing an ancient Indo-
Iranian myth, Von Stietencron describes a cycle that illustrates the nature of farr, in 
addition to linking farr to Weber’s ideas of charismatic action and kingship (19). In Von 
Stietencron’s example Yima, the first man, loses the divine farr due to his “misconduct” 
(19). As a result, the world’s “moral order is corrupted” and the forces of the dark “gain 
the upper hand” (Von Stietencron 19). During this time of “darkness” an evil dictator 
assumed power and claimed the entire world’s “riches for himself” (Von Stietencron 19). 
Order in the world was only able to be restored when a young hero is granted with the 
victorious aura of the farr and kills the usurper (Von Stietencron 19). In the process of 
defeating the forces of darkness the young hero receives the farr and is granted the right 
to rule the world at the behest of Ahura Mazda. In Weberian terms, the hero’s skill in 
battle set him apart from other warriors and his defeat and subsequent ascension to the 
throne of ancient Iran further distinguished him from the population. 
Regardless of how charisma is categorized or named, there is an important concept 
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of Weber’s that is central to the understanding charismatic authority. Weber writes that 
charismatic authority, because it is so “specifically foreign to every-day routine 
structures,” is unstable (54). Charisma’s inherent instability lends itself to or requires 
transformation, or in Weberian terms “routinization,” in order to be secured along 
rational or tradition lines (Weber 54). In a general sense, the routinization of charisma is 
an attempt to sustain the “pure” charisma of the charismatic leader in way that it can 
either be passed on or institutionalized in some fashion (Weber 54-55). Weber is 
nonetheless clear that in searching for a new charismatic leader, followers must be 
“bound to certain distinguishing characteristics; thus, to rules with respect to which a 
tradition arises” (55). In this statement, Weber elucidates that whoever accepts the 
mantle of charisma, must themselves be privy to the charismatic ideals established by the 
previous leader. In some cases the followers can become the gatekeepers of the leader’s 
charisma choosing those leaders who best fit their conception of the charismatic 
prototype (58). Weber goes on to list a number of ways in which routinization can occur. 
One case in point that warrants mention is the case of hereditary charisma. Weber writes 
that “charisma is a quality transmitted by heredity,” although in many cases “it is still 
also sometimes necessary to select the proper heir” (56). Perhaps even more interesting 
is Weber’s assertion that in the case of hereditary charisma “[p]ersonal charisma may be 
totally absent” among the successors (57). 
Monika Horstmann comments on the work of Weber and his concept of 
routinization, identifying two ways in which routinization often occurs. In the first 
scenario, charisma is transferred to a successor of the current “office-holder” (171). In 
the second instance, charisma is “vested in the office itself and not in the office-holder” 
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(171). The goals of both routinization methods that Horstmann describes are designed to 
facilitate what Weber termed “Gentilcharisma” a “smooth” transition of charisma 
brought about “by the timely designation of a successor” (173). Weber himself notes the 
commonality of the practice of a charismatic leader designating his or her successor 
adding that, “in this case legitimacy is [also] acquired” (55). 
In order to support his theories regarding charisma, Weber draws from a number of 
historical and religious sources. As noted previously, Weber was aware of various 
aspects of Islam and was even familiar with Zoroastrianism. Regardless, Weber’s 
inclusions of various Islamic and Iranian aspects in his scholarship of charisma is often 
presented in a cursory fashion and, in some cases, present a decidedly Orientalist point of 
view (Weber 19, 258). Furthermore, there is no mention of Shi’i Islam and what 
Lindholm describes as a “distinctive Shi’ite premise of a charismatic lineage of 
redemptive figures” in Weber’s scholarship (The Islamic 168). It is to the “charismatic 
lineage” of the Shi’i, and the scholarship of those who have taken Weber’s studies of 
charisma and applied them to the Shi’i that this work will now turn. 
Shi’i Islam itself arose in the turbulent period after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 C.E., and is rooted in the debate over who should lead the Muslim 
community or ummah (Momen 11). Most Muslims accepted the transition of power to a 
succession of deputies known as Caliphs who served as the new leaders of Islam 
1 On the reigns of the first four “Rashidun” Caliphs see “The Caliphate” in Ira M. 
Lapidus A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002. Pg. 45. 
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(Momen 10). A minority of the early Muslims, however, believed that the Prophets 
cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali was the rightful successor to the Prophet both “as temporal 
head (Caliph)” and also “as spiritual head (Imam)” (Momen 11). 
While ‘Ali was eventually elected Caliph, his right to lead was never fully 
acknowledged by the Muslim community as a whole, and he faced great strife within the 
community during his Caliphate (Nasr 36). Conversely, the fact that ‘Ali was not chosen 
as the first Caliph was seen as a usurpation of his rightful authority by “his partisans 
(literally, Shi’ah Ali)” (Nasr 38). One threat to ‘Ali’s Caliphate was the rise of a relative 
of the third Caliphate ‘Uthman (d. 644 C.E.) named Muawiya (d. 680) who went on to 
found the Umayyad dynasty (661-950 C.E.) (Nasr 36). Umayyad rule was eventually 
accepted by most of the non-Alid Muslims and quickly developed into a powerful ruling 
institution (Nasr 35-36). ‘Ali was killed shortly after the ascent of the Umayyads, leaving 
a leadership vacuum for his partisans that was consequently filled by his progeny (Nasr 
40). For the Shi’ah, ‘Ali’s sons, as products of the union between ‘Ali and the Prophet’s 
daughter Fatima (d. 632) were the only “rightful leaders of Islam” (Nasr 40). The 
Shi’ahs acknowledgement first of ‘Ali and then his descendants as the just leaders of the 
Islamic community illustrates a key facet of Shi’i beliefs, principally the emphasis that is 
placed on proper leadership. 
The descendents of ‘Ali through Fatima came to be recognized as spiritual leaders 
or Imams2 by the Shi’i community, serving as saintly guides “and preserving and 
2 For an expanded reading of the history of Shi’ism and the development of the 
Imam see Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of 
Twelver Shi’ism. New York: Yale University Press, 1985. Pgs 61-83. 
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explaining the Divine Law” (Momen 147). One of the early Shi’i Imams, Husayn ibn 
‘Ali (the third Shi’i Imam), in addition to his role as a spiritual leader also adopted an 
activist position and sought to rebel against the Umayyads (Momen 28-29). Husayn’s bid 
for political authority was ultimately doomed as his small force faced a much larger 
Umayyad force on the plains surrounding Karbala, Iraq, leading to a struggle that ended 
with Husayn losing his life in 680 C.E. (Momen 30-31). According to Moojan Momen, 
“it would be difficult to exaggerate the impact and importance of the martyrdom of 
Husayn for the Shi’is” as it gave the Shi’i movement an “impetus” and tragic 
counterpoint to “intellectual justification” that the usurpation of ‘Ali and development of 
the Shi’i movement had developed (33). Husayn’s martyrdom also engendered a change 
in philosophy among the latter Shi’i Imams, especially after the time of the 6th Imam 
Ja’far (d.765 C.E.), because they adopted a quietist position, turning largely to scholarly 
pursuits (Jafri 289). L. Carl Brown refers to the process by which the Shi’i sought to 
avoid political action as the “spiritualization” of the Imamate because the Imams after 
Husayn effectively ceased to be political leaders and were, instead, relegated to the role 
of supreme religious leaders within the Shi’i community (38). 
While there are a great number of groups that fall under the umbrella of Shi’ism, 
it is Twelver or Ithna ‘Ashara Shi’ism that is the most relevant to the history of modern 
Iran, and therefore, will prove to be the most often discussed within the context of this 
work. Twelver Shi’is look to twelve successors or Imams of the Prophet Muhammad as 
special spiritual leaders. The first Imam recognized by Twelver Shi’is is ‘Ali, with the 
Imamate being passed to his sons Hassan and Husayn (the second and third Imams 
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respectively) then progressing through Husayn’s line to the Twelfth Imam Muhammad 
al-Mahdi (Quinn, Historical Writing 4). The Twelfth Imam is believed to have entered a 
period of occultation or hiding (ghayba) shortly after his father the Eleventh Imam died 
in 874 C.E. (Momen 161). The Twelfth Imam is believed to have entered his period of 
hiding by disappearing down a well, and it is believed that he will one day return from 
this same well to bring justice to the world (Momen 162). 
The Twelver Shi’i “doctrine of occultation” effectively states that God placed the 
Twelfth Imam into hiding in order to protect him and extend his life “until the day when 
he will manifest himself again by God’s permission” (Momen 165). The need for the 
Twelfth Imam’s occultation is linked to the Shi’i belief that the Twelfth Imam’s life was 
in jeopardy from the enemies of the Shi’i (Momen 165). Despite being in hiding, the 
Twelfth Imam is still believed to be part of the physical world, but out of direct contact 
with it (Momen 165). The occultation of the Twelfth Imam also contains a strong 
eschatological component, as the Twelfth Imam is also regarded as al-Mahdi or “the 
rightly guided one,” a messianic figure who will return at the end of days and lead a great 
battle against the enemies of Islam (Momen 165-166). The occultation of the Twelfth 
Imam is a significant event in its own right; it is also significant because it paved the way 
for the rise of the Shi’i clergy or ‘ulama, who took over the administration and spiritual 
leadership of the Shi’i community after the Twelfth Imam went into hiding (Armstrong, 
The Battle 52). The effect of the occultation of the Twelfth Shi’i Imam on the Shi’ah and 
the development of charismatic Shi’i figures will be elaborated upon in future chapters. 
Iran’s relationship with Islam, like the Shi’i movement, began shortly after the 
death of the Prophet Muhammad. Under the reign of the second Caliph ‘Umar (d. 644 
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C.E.) the Arab Muslim armies swept into the realm of the Persian-Iranian Sassanid 
Empire, defeating the once great Empire’s armies with relative ease (Garthwaite 120). 
Iran’s conversion to Islam was a gradual process since most of Iran’s population, at the 
time of the Arab conquest, were Zoroastrians who were accorded protected status by the 
Arab Muslims because of their monotheistic leanings (Garthwaite 120). Nevertheless, 
within a couple of hundred years the vast majority of Iranians had converted to Islam 
(Garthwaite 120). The Iranian population embrace of Islam is one thing; they did not, 
however, completely reject their pre-Islamic Iranian history and culture in favor of an 
Arab-Islamic identity. 
A good example of the amalgamation of pre-Islamic Iranian identity and Islamic 
Arab culture is the Persian language. Gene R. Garthwaite notes that while “Arabic as a 
language was in a sense rejected” by the Iranians, the Persian language nevertheless 
adopted the Arabic script and many Arabic loan words (120). The creation of the 
Shahnamah or Persian Book of Kings, an epic poem about the glory of Iran’s pre-Islamic 
kings, further illustrates the symbiotic relation of Iranian culture and Islamic values. The 
Shahnamah was one of the first major works written in “new” Persian or Persian written 
using the Arabic script by ‘Abul Qasim Ferdowsi (940-1020 C.E.), a Muslim who 
presented “some of the heroes of his poem with Muslim values” (Mottahedeh, The 
Mantle 157). 
As Islam developed as a ruling institution it too would come to adapt certain 
facets of the cultures and people it had conquered. The successors to the Umayyads, the 
Abbasids (750-1258 C.E.) were based in Baghdad not far from the former home of the 
Sassanid Empire. They “revived” Persian concepts of “universal rulership” and 
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legitimacy to suit their needs (Garthwaite 118). The Abbasids, and the numerous 
dynasties that arose in Iran and Central Asia after the Abbasid’s decline, invested heavily 
in Persian culture as is evident in the literature, art, and bureaucratic tradition of much of 
the 11th century C.E. (Lapidus 129-131). Persian language and culture also survived a 
succession of invasions by Turkish peoples who came to dominate much of the Iranian 
culture sphere in the ninth and tenth centuries C.E. (Garthwaite 128). Iranian culture was 
also able to weather the cataclysmic effects of the Mongol invasions in the mid thirteenth 
century (Garthwaite 140). The Mongols’ holdings in the Middle East were ruled from 
the heart of Iran, where they picked up the trappings of Persian culture and even 
converted to Islam (Garthwaite 141-143). The Mongols, like many of the ruling 
dynasties that had come before them, eventually “dissolved into competing provincial 
states” laying the foundation for the steppe conqueror Timur, or Tamerlane, to establish a 
new Empire (Lapidus 229). After Timur’s death in 1405 C.E., Iran and central Asia were 
once again divided into a number of mini-Empires controlled by the sons of Timur 
(Lapidus 229-230). 
In 1501 a young military leader named Isma’il swept through Iran with his 
zealous followers conquering Iran and establishing the Safavid Empire (1501-1722 C.E.). 
The Safavids brought the whole of Iran under the rule of a single dynasty for the first 
time since the fall of the Sassanid Empire to the Arab conquest (Newman, Safavid Iran 
2). It is under the Safavids that the population of Iran was converted to Twelver Shi’ism 
despite the Sunni leanings of much of the country (Quinn, Historical Writing 4). In order 
to aid in the conversion process, the Safavids brought Shi’i clerics to Iran from 
throughout the Arab world (Quinn, Historical Writing 5). Many of the Shi’i clerics 
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brought to Iran laid the foundation for a powerful cleric establishment that eventually 
produced Khomeini (Quinn, Historical Writing 5). Arjomand, for example, views Iran’s 
Islamic revolution in 1979 “as the last stage of the evolution of clerical authority in 
Shi’ite Islam” begun in Safavid times (“History, Structure” 112). The links between 
revolutionary charisma and Shi’i Islam and the development of the Shi’i Imam are where 
this work will now turn. 
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II. THE CHARISMATIC IMAM 
The belief that ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (d. 661 C.E.) was designated by the Prophet 
Muhammad to be his successor as leader of the Muslim community (ummah) after the 
Prophet’s death is the belief that defines the Shi’i experience. While there are many 
events that the Shi’i reference in order to justify ‘Ali’s claim to leadership, the 
importance of the events at Ghadir Khumm often take precedence (Dakake 33-34). The 
Prophet Muhammad, who was returning to Medina from his final pilgrimage to Mecca in 
632 C.E., is said to have stopped his caravan at a place called Ghadir Khumm (Momen 
15). It is recorded that the Prophet led the Muslims in prayer and declared, “For 
whomever I am their lord (mawla) ‘Ali is their lord (mawla)” (qtd. in Dakake 35). 
According to Maria Massi Dakake, the Prophet’s selection of ‘Ali followed a lengthy 
“fatherly” themed sermon based around the Qur’anic verse, “The Prophet is closer to the 
believers than their selves, and he is a father for them, and his wives are their mother” 
(qtd. in Dakake 35). Essentially, the Prophet, in his sermon at Ghadir Khumm, 
engendered his followers with a sense of “filial piety,” which he first directed at himself 
and then at ‘Ali (Dakake 53). 
Descriptions of the events that took place at Ghadir Khumm survive primarily in 
Shi’i sources. It is important to note, however, that accounts of Ghadir Khumm are also 
preserved in some Sunni traditions (Dakake 43). Many of the differences between the 
Sunni and Shi’i accounts of Ghadir Khumm revolve around the lack of mention of ‘Ali’s 
“familial connections” in the Sunni sources (Dakake 35). Conversely, the Shi’i sources 
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stress ‘Ali’s “unrivaled closeness to the Prophet” (Dakake 35). The word choice of the 
Prophet is also significant as he calls ‘Ali mawla or wali instead of the “more doctrinally 
precise term” of imam, which the Shi’i eventually adopted (Dakake 35). Despite the 
many different readings of the Ghadir Khumm traditions, “it is hard to deny that it 
confers on ‘Ali a kind of spiritual distinction that sets him apart from the other close 
companions of the Prophet” (Dakake 35). 
For the Shi’i, Ghadir Khumm represents but one of the many instances in which 
‘Ali, and other family members of the Prophet Muhammad, were singled out by the 
Prophet as his successors (Momen 11-15). Some of the more salient examples of the 
Shi’ah’s arguments besides Ghadir Khumm come from ‘Ali’s place as the first male 
besides the Prophet to embrace Islam, and ‘Ali’s role as the Prophet’s “chief assistant” in 
life” (Momen 11-13). The Shi’i also reference other traditions to support their claim that, 
like Ghadir Khumm, have found homes in Sunni traditions (Momen 15). For example, 
both Sunni and Shi’i sources recount that: 
The Prophet took the hand of Hasan and Husayn [‘Ali’s sons and the 
Prophet’s grandsons] and said: “Whoever loves me loves these two and 
loves their mother and father, will be with me in my station on the Day of 
Resurrection.” [and] “Hasan and Husayn are the chiefs of the youths of 
paradise” (qtd. in Momen 15). 
Once again, both Sunni and Shi’i sources emphasize the importance that the Prophet 
placed on his family or the ahl al-bayt3. Similar to the traditions of Ghadir Khumm, 
3 For more on the evolution of the use of ahl al-bayt see Jonathan P. Berkey The 
Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pg 88. 
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these mutually accepted traditions take on a Sunni or Shi’i bent depending on the 
leanings of those who reference them. For example, the Shi’i view the tradition cited 
above as an extension of the Prophet’s designation of ‘Ali to his sons Hassan and Husayn 
(Momen 15). For the Sunnis, the tradition cited above certainly presents Hassan and 
Husayn as significant individuals in Islam, however, it does not firmly place them in a 
position of leadership. 
Questions of historical and religious shading and interpretation are found not only 
in those traditions that relate to ‘Ali’s designation, but to the question of succession after 
the Prophet’s death. Moojan Momen writes “the succession to Muhammad is clearly the 
key question in Shi’i Islam and the principal factor separating Shi’is from the Sunni 
majority” (11). Perhaps even more central to those Muslims who professed Shi’i 
leanings is a question of not just who would succeed the Prophet Muhammad, but 
ultimately what “the nature of the role of this successor” should be (Momen 11). Those 
Muslims who would eventually become the Shi’i, unlike the Sunni, were not simply 
concerned with a succession of worldly authority, but an extension of the Prophet’s 
spiritual charisma (Momen 11). 
The question of succession after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, while an 
important and defining question to the partisans of ‘Ali and scholars of Shi’ism alike, is 
not a question that will form a central theme of this work. More important will be the 
question of why the issue of succession arose in the first place. In an introduction to a 
work containing a collection of essays addressing Shi’i leadership, Linda S. Walbridge 
makes some inquiries that are worthy of note. One of Walbridge’s questions concerns 
whether or not “politics” or “heredity” ought to “be the overriding consideration in 
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determining leadership” (3). Another question posed by Walbridge concerns what skills 
and “attributes” are required of a leader (3). Finally, Walbridge asks, “should charisma 
override learning, or is it the other way around?” (3). The answers to the first two of 
Walbridge’s questions when considered from the Shi’i perspective are not difficult to 
answer. When they are, however, considered with a slight re-working of Walbridge’s 
third question to “should charisma override everything,” the answers to her first two 
questions become more complex and subsequently more difficult to answer. In this 
reworking of Walbridge’s question, charisma is placed at the forefront, with heredity and 
learning moving to background. The purpose of this section will be to argue that the 
office of the Shi’i Imam is a charismatic office established by a collection of figures 
whose charisma defined the Shi’i experience, in addition to being organized and 
ultimately routinized along Weberian lines. Once the role of charisma is established this 
section will turn to the “mystery” of the Twelfth Imam’s occultation and the perpetuation 
of the Imam’s charismatic image inherent in the Twelfth Imam’s return (Walbridge 3). 
Most scholarship of Shi’ism places a great deal of significance on the lives and 
actions of the first three Shi’i Imams: ‘Ali ibn Talib (d. 661 C.E.), Hassan ibn ‘Ali (d 669 
C.E.), and Husayn ibn ‘Ali (d. 680 C.E.). The emphasis on the first three Imams is 
understandable as they characterized the Shi’i movement in its infancy, ultimately 
shaping the Shi’i struggle against what has come to be known as the Sunni majority. The 
approach of basing much of the development of the Shi’i on the actions of the first three 
Imams can be said to compose the “traditional” or conventional argument for the nature 
of the charismatic Imam. The “traditional” argument in conjunction with studies that 
present different, and more recent, arguments for the charismatic nature of the Shi’i 
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Imam based on the teachings of ideas of Max Weber serve as the basis for much of this 
section’s argument. 
Before the death of the Prophet Muhammad, ‘Ali was known as a very active 
participant in the Muslim community and “a great warrior in the forefront of all the 
battles fought under Muhammad” (Jafri 59). ‘Ali for example, was the Prophet’s 
“standard-bearer” in a number of early battles between the Muslims of Medina and the 
armies of Mecca (Momen 13). Beyond being a “standard bearer” ‘Ali is renowned for 
his own skill in combat, “symbolized by his legendary fork-tongued sword zulfiqar” 
(Nasr 37). Because of ‘Ali’s heroism he has been accorded many titles that are 
referenced by both Sunnis and Shi’is alike (Nasr 37). ‘Ali is also popularly believed to 
have risked his life for the Prophet by sleeping in the Prophet’s bed in order to thwart an 
assassination attempt and facilitate an escape to Medina (Nasr 37). 
After the Prophet’s death, ‘Ali’s demeanor changed, becoming more reserved. He 
was often reported to have, “confined [himself] to the four walls of his house,” presenting 
an image in stark contrast to the fearless warrior of his younger years (Jafri 59). The 
change in ‘Ali’s behavior is equated with the rise of the office of the Caliph as the leaders 
of the Muslim community (ummah) after the Prophet’s death (Jafri 60). Even though 
others were appointed to the position of Caliph before ‘Ali, he maintained “that he was 
better qualified for the caliphate and that he had been unjustly deprived of leadership of 
the community” (Jafri 61). In a collection of ‘Ali’s sermons known as the Nahj al-
Balagha, his position that the first three Caliphs were usurpers is clarified, in addition to 
expanding ‘Ali’s plan for the future (Jafri 62). The Nahj al-Balagha also explains the 
quietist position that ‘Ali adopted saying, “So I adopted patience, although there was a 
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mote rankling in my eye and a bone sticking in my throat on seeing my heritage being 
plundered” (qtd. in Jafri 62). 
It is to patience, and the composition of his sermons that ‘Ali turned after being 
passed over to lead the Muslim community, first by Abdullah ibn Abi Qahafa Abu Bakr 
(573-634 C.E.) and then by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (590-644 C.E.) and finally by ‘Uthman 
ibn ‘Affan (579-656 C.E.). What is perhaps most interesting about ‘Ali’s statement is 
that he viewed the leadership of the community as his “heritage” (qtd. in Jafri 62). ‘Ali’s 
mention of the leadership as his heritage harkens back to the initial question and the 
formation of the Shi’ah, as well as calling Weberian notions of charismatic succession 
into play. Invoking a certain charismatic, religious heritage also illustrates the Shi’i belief 
that Muhammad and then ‘Ali were “the restorer[s] of the true religion of Abraham and 
Ishmael, and so in him the hereditary sanctity of his clan reached its highest level” (Jafri 
14). 
Hereditary notions of charismatic authority or “hereditary sanctity” are very 
important to the Shi’ah (Jafri 14). Weber acknowledged the clout that heredity could 
play in a succession, but also stated that inherited structures were not necessary if a 
successor was selected (56). To the Shi’ah, ‘Ali represents a union of both designated 
and hereditary succession because he was selected by the Prophet, and was familiarly tied 
to the Prophet through his marriage to the Prophet’s daughter Fatima (Momen 13). Shi’i 
supporter Habib ibn Muzahir (d. 680) presents the Shi’i conception of the ahl al-bayt (the 
family of the Prophet), and their importance to the Shi’i when he wrote, “The people of 
this sacred family [‘Ali, Fatima, and Hassan and Husayn] are those who are the best 
worshippers of God and who spend their mornings striving in the devotion of God” (qtd. 
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in Jafri 206). Since Muhammad did not have any sons that survived into adulthood, ‘Ali 
became, for all intensive purposes, his heir (Momen 14). Moreover, it is from ‘Ali and 
his supporters that the Shi’ah developed a routine of employing ‘Ali’s name and his 
closeness to God during prayer (Takim, “From Bid’a” 166). Fatima’s part in the 
development of the Shi’i cannot be underestimated as she “is considered the most holy of 
Muslim women” and “is called al-Zahra [the radiant]” (Chittick 137). Furthermore, 
Hassan and Husayn as the sons of ‘Ali and Fatima are literally the descendants of the 
Prophet. The emphasis on proper succession by the Shi’ah can be quantified in terms of 
charismatic succession and routinization, like those professed by Weber providing 
support for the argument that the Shi’i Imamate operated as an effective charismatic 
office in Weberian terms. 
The first section of this work already established that Muhammad was a 
charismatic figure, and that the charisma of a religious leader can go through a process of 
routinization in order be prolonged (Weber 54). Viewing Shi’i history and applying the 
concepts of Weber to the Shi’i perspective reveals a number of instances during the 
Prophet’s life in which he designated ‘Ali as his successor. The events that took place at 
Ghadir Khumm serve as one example of what the Shi’i believe to be a very public 
confirmation of ‘Ali’s place once the Prophet was gone (Momen 15). There is also the 
Shi’i claim that in the Prophet’s last minutes of life he called for writing supplies in order 
to put ‘Ali’s succession in writing, but was put off by ‘Umar (who became the second 
Caliph) (Momen 16). To the proto-Shi’i, it appears that the Prophet was striving to 
achieve the Gentilcharisma or the smooth transition of charismatic authority that Weber 
describes (Horstmann 173). 
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Further proof for the Shi’ah’s embrace of Weberian notions of charismatic 
routinization are seen after the death of ‘Ali. In 661 C.E. ‘Ali was killed, leaving the 
Shi’i Imamate in the hands of his oldest son Hassan (Momen 26). The Imamate of 
Hassan is marked not by the battles and political struggles that characterized the Imamate 
of his father ‘Ali (Momen 27). Instead, Hassan removed himself from the political scene 
in favor of the patient, contemplative life (Momen 27). Some scholars of Shi’ism have 
painted Hassan as a weak figure who abandoned the Shi’i, and all but handed over the 
Caliphate to the Umayyad Caliph Mu’awiya (Momen 27). According to Momen, the 
harsh treatment of Hassan by some scholars is not in concurrence with the view of the 
Shi’i historians, who view Hassan’s “abdication not [as] an act of feeble cowardice but a 
realistic and compassionate act” (27). The Shi’i historians believe that in stepping aside 
Hassan actually prevented “pointless bloodshed” (Momen 27). There also seems to have 
been some distinction between Mu’awiya’s political and military strength and Hassan’s 
“religious precedence” (Momen 27). Regardless of certain distinctions, Hassan and his 
followers (the Shi’ah ‘Ali) were left to their own devices and granted “general amnesty” 
after Hassan’s deal with Mu’awiya (Momen 27). Hassan may have not been the most 
dynamic of the Shi’i Imams; nevertheless, he maintained the Alid community in the face 
of a hazardous political climate. Moreover, the proto-Shi’i looked to him for leadership 
because of his religious credentials and relationship to the Prophet. Hassan is even 
popularly “reported to have resembled the Prophet in appearance” (Jafri 131). Even 
Weber notes that a deficiency in individual charisma does not necessarily result in the 
end of charismatic transmission (57). 
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It is the life and subsequent death of the third Shi’i Imam, Husayn, that forms the 
basis of what can be called a “traditional” argument for the charismatic nature of the Shi’i 
Imamate. Husayn became the third Shi’i Imam, and head of the family of the Prophet 
(ahl al-bayt) after the death of Hassan in 669 C.E. (Jafri 177). Like Hassan, Husayn 
“combined in his person the right of descent both from the Prophet and ‘Ali,” but unlike 
Hassan he was far more politically active (Jafri 177). It is recorded that the people of 
Mecca flocked to Husayn upon his arrival, praying and circumambulating the Ka’ba with 
him (Jafri 177). By the time of Husayn’s ascension, the Umayyad Caliph Mu’awiya had 
died, freeing Husayn and his Shi’i supporters from the treaty of inaction that Hassan had 
forged (Jafri 177). 
Apparently the threat that Husayn posed to the Umayyads did not go unnoticed by 
Mu’awiya, who warned his son and successor Yazid (d. 683) to be wary of the Grandson 
of the Prophet (Jafri 175). Mu’awiya, in his warning to Yazid, described a few 
individuals who could be problematic for their regime, but singled out Husayn saying, 
“Among them Husayn b. ‘Ali commands great love and respect because of his superior 
rights and close relationship to the Prophet” (Jafri 175). Syed Husyan Muhammad Jafri 
writes that Mu’awiya’s deathbed speech, “confirms the reports that Mu’awiya’s efforts to 
secure the approval of these grandees of Islam for Yazid’s succession had not been 
successful” (175). It seems that Mu’awiya was especially concerned about the people of 
Iraq because they had supported ‘Ali and had strong sympathies for the ahl al-bayt (Jafri 
175). It is also significant that Mu’awiya concedes that Husayn was in possession of 
certain gifts or “rights” that made him an especially potent foe. There is also a reference 
to Husayn’s connection to the Prophet and the political and religious significance that 
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such an association can draw. Yazid’s questionable succession combined with Husayn’s 
popularity and the instability in Iraq contributed to an unstable political situation in the 
Islamic world. Some sources also paint Yazid as a person who rejected certain Islamic 
values, and was widely believed to have been an alcoholic (Momen 28). Yazid’s 
blasphemous proclivities did not endear him to many Muslims who looked to Husayn to 
return the leadership of Islam to its unsullied roots. 
Yazid, in an attempt to quickly consolidate his power, sought an oath from 
Husayn similar to that of the agreement between Mu’awiya and Hassan (Jafri 175-176). 
Husayn, in move that resembled the Prophet’s escape from Mecca, was able to elude 
Yazid’s forces and make his way to Mecca from Syria (Jafri 176). In Mecca, Husayn 
began to receive letters and envoys from Iraq (especially Kufa), seeking his guidance and 
leadership and claiming “they had no Imam other than him” (qtd. in Jafri 177). The 
Kufans were particularly upset by Yazid’s perceived un-Islamic behavior often rioting in 
the streets in response (Armstrong, Battle 46). To use the charismatic-social context 
exposed by Lindholm and Barnes, the tense social situation created by Yazid’s rule and 
behavior created an environment that attracted the Kufans to Husayn’s charismatic 
lineage in the hopes of a religious revitalization. 
Husayn’s response to the Kufans, and his actions while in Mecca are interesting 
as Jafri notes they “show that from the beginning to end his [Husayn’s] strategy was 
aimed at a much higher goal than simply accession to the caliphate” (178). Husayn’s 
response to the Kufans is important as it contained details that related not just to a 
promise of political upheaval, but also contained a strong religious message. The 
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religious message of Husayn’s letter is significant enough that sections of it are worth 
reprinting here: 
God has chosen Muhammad from among his people, graced him with His 
Prophethood and selected him for His message. After he admonished the 
people and conveyed His message to them God took him back unto 
Himself. We being his family (ahl), his close associates endowed with the 
with the quality of guardianship (awliya)…his heir and legatee (warith), 
are the most deserving among all the people to take his place…the Book 
of God, and the Sunna of his Prophet, the Sunna which has become 
obliterated and innovations have become active and energetic. If you 
listen to me and obey my orders I will guide you to the right path (qtd. in 
Jafri 179-180). 
According to Jafri, Husayn’s letters act as a summarization of Shi’i theology in its 
infancy, presenting the Imam as a religious guide and restorer (180). Husayn’s letter is 
perhaps even more revealing in establishing the charismatic nature of the Shi’i. Husayn, 
like ‘Ali and Hassan, continued to stress the point that he was the legitimate heir to the 
Prophet. Furthermore, Husayn and his family have received special gifts that allow them 
to lead the Muslim community because of their hereditary proximity to the Prophet. 
While ‘Ali expressed in his writings that he had special talents that qualified him for 
leadership, he did not specifically identify what these qualities were (Jafri 61). Husayn 
clearly denotes the qualities that ‘Ali only hinted at, namely, protecting and leading the 
Muslim community aided by the gifts from their association of the Prophet. Husayn, in 
this statement, appears to support ‘Ali’s claims as he attacks the rulings and actions of the 
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first three Caliphs, whom he viewed as unjustly altering the sayings and actions of the 
Prophet (Jafri 181). 
Perhaps even more significant is Husayn’s mention of his ability to return the 
Muslim community to the right religious path. In stating that he will serve as their 
“guide,” Husayn takes on the prophetic-charismatic aura of his grandfather, making his 
bid for political action more legitimate. Husayn’s charismatic authority was almost 
certainly recognized by the Shi’ah ‘Ali who, as in the case of Qays ibn Mushir, refused to 
follow the Umayyad practice of cursing Husayn, yelling instead that “Husayn, the 
grandson of the Prophet, is the best man of his time among the men of God” (qtd in Jafri 
205). Further proof for Husayn’s abilities are seen in the statements he made as he set 
out for Kufa, which seem to suggest that he was aware of his fate, and ultimately that he 
was accepting of the situation (Jafri 185). 
Husayn’s martyrdom at the hands of the armies of Yazid created what Jafri terms 
“a deep heart-searching after-effect upon the Shi’is, giving a new turn to the mode and 
nature of the Shi’i movement” (222). The image of Husayn (who like Hassan was 
blessed with a strong resemblance to the Prophet) covered in over thirty wounds, yet still 
standing against the armies of the usurper Yazid’s armies, is a powerful testament to the 
abilities of Husayn. Nevertheless, the question that must be asked for the purposes of this 
work is what are the charismatic implications of the martyrdom of Husayn. From some 
of the analysis presented in previous paragraphs it can be said that Husayn was 
charismatic, both because of his lineage and closeness to the Prophet, and his personal 
charisma as a religious restorer. 
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Shi’i scholar Muhammad ‘Ali Amir-Moezzi writes that “none of his [Husayn’s] 
successors interpreted his presence in Karbala as being a ‘political’ act” (66). Instead, it 
appears that Husayn was basing his resistance to the Umayyads on purely grounds of 
religious reform, fulfilling his role as “a friend of God (wali)” (Amir Moezzi 66). Jafri, 
like Amir-Moezzi, reads the Shi’i conception of Husayn’s martyrdom “as a strictly 
religious issue” (233). The eighth Shi’i Imam, ‘Ali al-Rida (d. 818) even likened 
Husayn’s martyrdom to the actions of Abraham who was willing to sacrifice his son “in 
order to fulfill divine will” (Amir-Moezzi 67). Nevertheless, the religious connotations 
of Husayn’s stand were based on loyalty to the leadership of his father and Prophet-
grandfather, and have subsequently been transformed by later Shi’is into a “political 
ideology” (Amir Moezzi 67). In can be said, however, that even if Husayn did not seek 
any political post in his stand, it certainly drove many of his supporters to seek larger 
role’s in their social and religious order (Jafri 232-233). While Husayn and his brother 
and father had loyal followers, the number of those who could be counted upon as 
faithful partisans was constantly in flux (Jafri 222-223). For example, many of the 
Kufans who had sent their pleas to Husayn for leadership and religious guidance in the 
end failed to aid Husayn in his time of greatest need (Jafri 223). The Kufan’s failure to 
act engendered a “deep sense of repentance,” that subsequently led to the creation of the 
Tawwabun or penitent movement (Jafri 222). The Tawwabun felt that they could atone 
for their inability to act in Husayn’s defense “by exposing themselves to death while 
seeking vengeance for the blood of Husayn” (Jafri 222). Husayn is therefore a 
charismatic leader in both the Weber and Barnes sense of a charismatic entity who was 
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able to attract followers because of his religious mission, and in terms of Tucker’s idea of 
a charismatic phenomenon, which attracted followers after his death. 
Husayn in death not only secured the loyalty of more followers for his 
descendents, he also inspired a frenzied sense of loyalty and justice among the Shi’ah 
based on a charismatic obligation for his martyrdom. Jafri notes that even while the 
Tawwabun eventually lost the zealousness that characterized their actions following 
Husayn’s death they were, nevertheless, imbued with “a strong feeling of duty and a deep 
sense of religious obligation” (233). The “obligation” that Jafri describes is one to the 
ahl al-bayt and the partisans of ‘Ali moving “Shi’ism another step forward towards an 
independent and self-sustaining existence” (233). The fact that many of the Shi’i turned 
to Husayn’s son, ‘Ali Zayn al-Abidin as their new Imam shows just how powerful 
notions of charismatic succession and proper leadership had taken hold in the Shi’i 
community (Jafri 229). Tales of the courageous death of the Prophet’s grandson spread 
throughout the Islamic world bringing in converts to the Shi’i cause from the Arab 
territories, as well as significant sympathy from many Persian converts to whom the 
populist nature of the Shi’ah ‘Ali held a “wider appeal” (Jafri 232). 
Perhaps nowhere is the self-sustaining nature of Shi’ism more apparent than in the 
commemoration ceremonies of Husayn’s martyrdom “during the first ten days of 
Muharram (the month in the Islamic Calendar in which Husayn was martyred)” (Momen 
33). The reenactments of Husayn’s death during Muharram serve not only to foster “an 
ethos of sanctification through martyrdom,” but also to keep the charismatic nature and 
obligation of Husayn and those of his household fresh in the mind of the Shi’i (Momen 
33). Husayn’s death also further entrenched the Shi’i view that “every single one of the 
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Imams suffered martyrdom” (Momen 33). The culture of persecution and martyrdom 
within the Shi’i community help account for the need for the constant presence of a 
charismatic leader (the Imam). As Barnes has noted, a time of great social and religious 
upheaval “which causes distress and dissatisfaction among a segment of the population” 
is often a key element in the promoting of charismatic individuals (4). 
The actions and abilities of ‘Ali, Hassan, and Husayn also played an important 
role in shaping the Shi’i conception of the Imam. Momen notes that in following the 
trend of the first three Imams, the Shi’ah came to view designation (nass) as increasingly 
important as the Imams themselves were seen as increasingly significant figures (145). 
By the time of the sixth (Ja’far al-Sadiq d. 765) and seventh Imams (Musa al-Kazim d. 
799), the office of the Imamate had come to be equated with certain special attributes 
(Momen 154). The Imams, for example, were believed to be free from sin and error 
(i’sma), as well as having access to special religious knowledge (‘ilm) (Momen 155). 
Among the Shi’i it is believed that, “the imams are the Gate [bab] or the Threshold that 
allows the passage into Divine Knowledge” that was closed to all but them (Amir-Moezzi 
70). The writings of a contemporary of the eighth and ninth Imams, al-Fadl ibn Shadhan 
al-Nisaburi (d. 874) show that the idea of the Imams having sole access to special 
religious knowledge was not universally accepted (Bayhom-Daou 193). Al-Fadl believed 
that all humans could access the knowledge of the Imams through learning; however, he 
kept his view confined to his private writings as it went against the belief of most of the 
Shi’i community (Bayhom-Daou 193). Since the majority of the Shi’ah understood that 
the Shi’i Imam was privy to religious knowledge that was outside of that of the standard 
Muslim and also free from error, the Imam was the ideal judge and was worthy of the 
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spiritual leadership (walaya) of the community (Momen 156-157). It is because of the 
unique abilities of the Imam that proper designation continued to be important as the 
sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq wrote, “Do you imagine that we place this Cause of ours [the 
Imamate] with whomsoever we wish? No! Not at all!...None of us (the Imams) die until 
God has informed us of the one who is to succeed us (qtd. in Momen 154). 
At an even more esoteric level, the Shi’i Imamate is conceived in terms of divine 
light (nûr), whose existence pre-dated the creation of the world (Amir-Moezzi 40). It is 
then believed that God placed this “Light of prophecy (the Imamate)” into Adam starting 
its passage “through the generations of humanity, covering the spaces and times of the 
sacred history of humanity” (Amir-Moezzi 40). The transfer of the light of the Shi’i 
Imamate from Adam to the Imams themselves creates a sanctified genealogy that 
certainly imbues proper succession (and therefore, proper designation) with a great deal 
of meaning. The idea of the Shi’i Imams emerging from a source of ancient luminosity 
has little charismatic merit on its own, yet the fact that the Shi’i view the ascendance of 
each Imam, as a completion of God’s prophetic will suggest that each Imam is a holder of 
the charisma of the past Prophets. Tamima Bayhom-Daou disagrees with much of Amir-
Moezzi’s arguments for the “esoteric doctrine” of “pre-ghayba [occultation] Imamism,” 
on the basis that Amir-Moezzi was founding his arguments on “late sources” (189). Even 
though Amir Moezzi’s scholarship may make use of later sources, it is still relevant to the 
scope of this work as it shows that the Shi’ah living after the Twelfth Imam’s occultation 
certainly viewed the Imams in a charismatic light. 
Maria Massi Dakake in her book, The Charismatic Community: Shi’ite Identity in 
Early Islam presents a different argument for the charismatic nature of the Shi’i Imam 
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from the “traditional” argument put forth by Jafri and Momen. Dakake bases her 
argument on the assertion that the Shi’i Imam did not exclusively depend “on the 
genealogically transmitted charisma of the Prophet…in order to be ‘religious’” (6). 
Instead, Dakake suggests that it was the charismatic presence of ‘Ali that served as the 
basis for the charismatic nature of the Shi’i Imamate (6). In order to substantiate her 
claim, Dakake relies on a number of sources (both Sunni and Shi’i) that relate the 
“unshakeable bond” between ‘Ali and his supporters expressed in terms of walayah (6). 
Walayah is most commonly understood as a bond that enables an individual to “exercise 
authority” (Izzi-Dien 6: 208). Dakake argues, however, that walayah means something 
more for the Shi’ah saying, “it [walayah] is a concept that has been part of the Shi’ite 
believers over centuries of substantial doctrinal and political change” (7). Furthermore, 
the Shi’i view walayah in terms of “spiritual charisma” that represents the “Shi’ite 
religious ethos” (Dakake 7). The “religious ethos” that Dakake views walayah 
representing in the Shi’i community refers to a multi-faceted connection containing 
“God, the Prophet, the Imam and the community of Shi’ite believers” (7). P.E. Walker 
goes even further suggesting that walayah, along with prayer (salat) and the pilgrimage 
to Mecca (hajj), represents another “pillar” of Islam of for the Shi’ah (6: 209). 
Dakake draws extensively on the Ghadir Khumm tradition for insight into the 
charisma of ‘Ali. The revelation of a particular Qur’anic verse after the Prophet’s speech 
at Ghadir Khumm which states, “This day I have perfected your religion for you and 
completed my favor unto you,” is often understood by the Shi’i to be “confirmation that 
the walayah of ‘Ali was the final ‘piece’ that perfected the religion of Islam” (Dakake 
46). It appears, after the Prophet’s death and the subsequent usurpation of ‘Ali for the 
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Caliphate, that ‘Ali’s charismatic aura grew (Dakake 58). Dakake’s view of ‘Ali 
contends with Jafri’s “traditional” argument to some degree as he writes that the 
“hereditary sanctity” that Hassan, and to an even greater extent Husayn, capitalize on 
were perceived as coming from the Prophet through their mother Fatima (Jafri 229). Jafri 
observes that in many cases Hassan and Husayn were referred to not “as the sons of 
‘Ali,” but as “the son[s] of the daughter of our Prophet” (229). 
Despite Jafri’s argument, Dakake maintains that ‘Ali can easily be considered a 
charismatic figure based both on Weber’s categorizations and his perceived gifts and 
talents by the Shi’ah (Dakake 8). Moreover, evidence from the early Safavid period 
reveal a form of Shi’ism that “engendered a devotion to ‘Ali, in particular” (Takim, 
“From Bid’a” 169). Dakake further contends that the bonds of walayah (charisma) that 
‘Ali initially received as a result of military exploits and the Ghadir Khumm were further 
increased thanks in large part to the belief that ‘Ali had access to the Prophet’s will and 
testament (Dakake 58). From the Shi’i perspective, the Prophet’s will delivered into 
Fatima’s possession after his death, and had, conversely, been dictated by ‘Ali in the first 
place making it a natural assumption that ‘Ali would have had access to such a religious 
treasure (Dakake 58). Being the recipient of the Prophet’s final words gave ‘Ali 
tremendous prestige and implied that ‘Ali had “exclusive knowledge of the Prophet’s will 
for his community,” further confirming the Shi’i ideal of ‘Ali’s place as the rightful 
successor to the Prophet (Dakake 58). 
Dakake notes that while the spiritual charisma inherent in the Shi’i conception of 
walayah was first “associated primarily with ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib,” it eventually evolved 
into “a state of absolute allegiance and devotion” to the Imams (104). The loyalty and 
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affection that the Shi’ah show to the Imams is, in turn, reflected on them making them 
part (however small) of the “charisma and spiritual status of the Imams” (Dakake 168). 
By this statement Dakake means that the Shi’ah, in showing proper respect and reverence 
for the Imams, essentially become part of the charisma of the Imams. In presenting a 
cyclical interchange of charisma between the Shi’i Imams and their partisans, Dakake not 
only supports her argument for the conception of the Shi’i as a “charismatic community,” 
but also reflects on a number of points that are relevant to the line of reasoning for the 
charismatic station of the Imam (10). Regardless of how Hassan and Husayn where 
referenced, in Dakake’s view ‘Ali was a charismatic figure who caused a somewhat 
arbitrary Arabic term (walayah) to become a central spiritual pillar of the Shi’i 
community. Moreover, the effect of laying a charismatic foundation based on the 
distinctly Shi’i concept of walayah enable the Shi’is, through their devotion to the 
spiritual guidance of the Imams, to themselves be part of the essential charisma of the 
Imamate. In doing so, Dakake presents a degree of charismatic interplay between a 
charismatic leader and their followers that Weber in his analysis of personal charisma and 
its “recruitment” potential did not even begin to categorize (Weber 58). 
Liyakat N. Takim presents yet another explanation and argument for the 
charismatic nature for the Shi’i that is based on his own research, in addition to being 
strongly grounded in Weber’s theories on charisma. It is Weber’s conception of the 
routinization of charisma that provides a strong basis for Takim’s arguments. Takim 
notes that in looking to a succession of Imams, the Shi’i attempted to extend the original 
of charisma of the Prophet, whereas the Sunnis sought to immediately routinize it (The 
Heirs 24). The problem with routinization, Takim notes, “is the paucity of charismatic 
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figures” to succeed the original charismatic figure after the death (The Heirs 5). For 
those Muslims that came to form the Shi’i the death of the Prophet did not present the 
problem of succession that Weber describes, as there were charismatic individuals to take 
the Prophet’s place in the form of ‘Ali and his children (Takim, The Heirs 26). 
Conversely, the rise of the Sunni Caliphate is presented by Takim as an example of the 
quickness with which the proto-Sunnis routinized the charisma of the Prophet in the 
perceived absence of charismatic figures that characterized the beliefs of their Shi’i 
brethren (The Heirs 24-25). Takim, like Momen, Jafri, and, to a degree, Dakake 
recognizes and elaborates on the importance of proper leadership and hereditary 
succession (The Heirs 24-25). It is not, however, to notions of “hereditary sanctity” that 
Takim turns to as the crux of his argument. Instead, it is the Shi’i desire “to perpetuate 
Muhammad’s charismatic legacy” that Takim points to as the central theme in the 
argument for the charismatic nature of Shi’ism (The Heirs 25). 
Of course, explaining that the Shi’i look to the Prophet’s “charismatic legacy” as 
the reason for the creation of their religious movement begs the question of just what is 
the nature of the Prophet’s charisma. For Takim, Muhammad’s charisma stems from his 
ability to tap into and elaborate upon the divine ethical message “of the great biblical 
prophets” (The Heirs 3-4). The ethical message of Muhammad naturally included the 
Qur’an, which provided “a new ethical-moral structure” that eventually replaced many 
aspects of Arabian society (Takim, The Heirs 4). In order to explain how the Shi’i Imam 
came to inherent the Prophet’s charismatic-ethical mantle, Takim presents two terms of 
his own adaptation. The first term that Takim employs is the “Shari’man.” Generally, 
the Shari’man refers to those individuals who fill in the “lacuna in the [Islamic] legal 
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field” who are often outside the realm of political power (Takim, The Heirs 30). In the 
case of the Shi’i, the Shari’man refers to the Imams themselves and their more scholastic 
disciples (Takim, The Heirs 30). The second term that Takim uses to define the charisma 
of the Shi’i Imam is that of the “Holy Man.” The holy man, according to Takim, is 
someone who is concerned with the more esoteric aspects of Islam (The Heirs 42-43). 
The Sufi shaykh epitomizes the role of Takim’s holy man, as the shaykh encapsulates the 
“spiritual authority” of the Prophet because of an ability to connect to the divine or the 
numinous (The Heirs 42-43). 
Understanding both of Takim’s terms is important because the Shi’i Imams are 
able to carry on and ultimately complete the charismatic-ethical message of the Prophet 
due to their role as shari’men and holy men par excellence. Because of the Imam’s 
special religious knowledge (‘ilm) they were not only able to interpret the legal authority 
of the Prophet, but their own legal opinions and rulings came to form a distinct legal 
framework all its own (Takim, The Heirs 31-32). Perhaps even more important is the 
Shi’i Imam’s role as a holy man, where they served as “the nexus between the divine and 
human…[by] duplicating the Prophet’s spiritual journeys and devotional exercises” 
(Takim, The Heirs 57). Thus, through legal exegesis, and defined spiritual position the 
Shi’i Imam effectively extends that charismatic message of the Prophet by “230 years” 
until the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in 864 C.E. (Takim, The Heirs 25). 
With the occultation of the Twelfth Imam comes a host of questions. Once such 
question pertains to who should lead the Shi’ah in the Imam’s absence. Another question 
that is perhaps more important to the scope of this work is what happened to the charisma 
of the Twelfth Imam once he went into hiding. The bulk of this chapter has been devoted 
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to establishing that the Shi’i Imamate is a charismatic office, regardless of whether or not 
one particular argument for the charisma of the Shi’i Imams presented above is accepted, 
or some combination of the three. As such, the loss of such a figure could be viewed as 
quite a blow to the Shi’i community. According to most sources, the Twelfth Imam was 
taken into hiding by God as a child and, therefore, did not have any children to mark as a 
successor (Momen 162). The result of the end to the chain of designation and succession 
was the removal of the charismatic presence of the Imam, which had defined the Ithna 
‘Ashura or “Twelver” Shi’i since their inception. 
For Twelver Shi’is, the idea that they were without an Imam was 
incomprehensible due to the belief that the world couldn’t exist without the presence of 
an Imam. ‘Ali, for example, is said to have famously declared that, “The earth will 
engulf its inhabitants. If one of us [an Imam] is not upon it” (qtd. in Amir-Moezzi 61). It 
is from the lack of a physical Imam coupled with the belief that Imam was necessary to 
maintain the order of the world that the Shi’i doctrine of occultation (ghayba) was born 
(Momen 165). The doctrine of occultation (ghayba) states that God took the Twelfth 
Imam into hiding in order to protect him from the many enemies of the Shi’i (Momen 
165). Furthermore, the Twelfth Imam is still part of the world and “in control of the 
affairs of men” (Momen 165). Because of the Twelfth Imam’s presence in the physical 
world, he is still able to regulate the actions of the world, acting as the “axis mundi 
around which the spheres of existence rotate” (“Ithna ‘Ashariyya” 4: 275). 
The occultation of the Twelfth Imam is often divided into two different phases: 
the lesser occultation (874-941 C.E.) and the greater occultation (941-Present C.E.) 
(Momen 162-164). The lesser occultation is characterized by the lives of a series of 
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mediators, who were able to communicate with and pass on the will of the Twelfth Imam 
to the Shi’ah (Momen 162). The first of these “intermediaries” was ‘Uthman al-‘Amri, a 
close confidant and secretary of the tenth and eleventh Imams (Momen 162). While 
many scholars of Shi’ism view the occultation of the Twelfth Imam as a “crisis” that 
“overtook the Shi’ah,” some recent scholarship presents another point of view (Akhavi, 
“Contending” 230). Momen, for example, suggests that Al-‘Amri’s new position and the 
occultation of the Twelfth Imam in general, were not overly revolutionary or shocking to 
the Shi’i community due to a state of “effective occultation” of house arrest placed on the 
tenth (Abu’l Hassan ‘Ali ibn Muhammad al-Hadi 829-868 C.E.) and eleventh Imams 
(Abu Muhammad Hassan ibn ‘Ali al-‘Askari 845-874 C.E.) by the Abbasids (Momen 
162). Takim observes that many of the disciples of the Imams took on a larger role in the 
Shi’i community during the lifetimes of the late Shi’i Imams because the Imams were 
often inaccessible to the Shi’ah (Heirs 80). 
In order to prepare their devotees for life among their followers, the Imams 
provided them with special instruction and debating techniques, effectively passing on 
their charismatic message to a group of devout Shi’i adherents (Takim, Heirs 80-81). 
Takim views the increasing power and influence of the disciples of the Imams in terms of 
Weber’s notion of routinization (Heirs 81). In passing on their knowledge (‘ilm), the 
Imams created a charismatic office of scholars who were charged with protecting and 
transmitting “ the traditions of the Imams…and their divinely bestowed knowledge” 
(Takim, Heirs 81). If the charismatic foundations of Takim’s theories are accepted, then it 
is no great surprise that one of the eleventh Imam’s closest confidants assumed the 
position of the hidden-Twelfth Imam’s agent in the world after his occultation. Providing 
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even more support for Takim’s argument is the Weberian style of succession that the 
mediators of the Twelfth Imam practiced, designating successors until the death of the 
last arbitrator in 941 C.E. (Momen 164). With the death of Abu’l-Husayn ‘Ali ibn 
Muhammad as-Samarri the last gate (bâb) of the Twelfth Imam the lesser occultation is 
said to have ended in favor of the greater occultation, in which “there is no agent of the 
Hidden Imam on earth” (Momen 164). The greater occultation led the disciples of the 
Imams, the proto-Shi’i ‘ulama, to develop a number of doctrines regarding the actions of 
the Shi’i in the absence of the physical Imam (Akhavi, “Contending” 230). The 
cornerstone of this “new” Shi’i doctrine was abhorrence of political action, and a stigma 
towards any leader other than the Twelfth Imam (Akhavi, “Contending” 230). If 
anything, the Shi’i model for government in the years immediately following the 
occultation of the Twelfth Imam can be characterized by tolerance for “rule by secular,” 
or Sunni rulers provided they were “just” in most religious matters (Akhavi, “The 
Clergy’s” 100). In many ways, the anti-political discourse of the post-occultation Shi’i 
jurist reflects many sayings attributed to the fifth and sixth Imams, who discouraged their 
followers from seeking an activist stance (Takim, Heirs 80). 
With the doctrine of occultation (ghayba) also came a doctrine that addresses the 
return of the Twelfth Imam know as the raj’a. The doctrine of the raj’a adds an 
eschatological dimension to the Twelfth Imam who will return to the physical world and 
his religious and political duties as the Mahdi or rightly guided one (Momen 166). The 
Mahdi will then engage the forces of evil in a battle and bring about the end of days 
(Momen 166). Because of the importance of the Mahdi and his mission he is accorded 
“an extremely high status among human beings in general” (Bashir, Messianic Hopes 
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27). In other words, the Twelfth Imam or Mahdi is not merely a continuation of the 
charismatic Shi’i Imam, he is the sum total of the Shi’i charismatic experience; “a venue” 
that allows the Shi’i to “tap into the messianic hope” that had come to comprise their 
belief structure by the tenth century (Bashir, Messianic Hopes 23-24). 
Momen notes some signs that are believed to indicate the return of the Mahdi, the 
most common of which is a world that has “been filled with injustice and tyranny” (166). 
It is also believed that the Mahdi’s arrival will coincide with the erosion of Islam in its 
proper form, Twelver Shi’ism in this instance (Momen 167). In other words, the Mahdi 
will arrive when the world is full of social and religious strife, harnessing what Shahzad 
Bashir calls “the charisma inscribed in [the] traditions regarding the Twelfth Imam” 
(Messianic Hopes 28). Moreover, those that make the claim of being the Mahdi will, 
necessarily, break some aspects of the religious establishment in the process of becoming 
“Shi’ism’s greatest hope” (Bashir, Messianic Hopes 28). It is in the charismatic tradition 
of the Shi’i Imams, and under the guise of the Mahdi, that a young Sufi Shaykh named 
Isma’il conquered Iran and brought revolution that resulted in the rise of a Shi’i empire. 
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III. THE FIRST SHI’ITE REVOLUTION: SHAH ISMA’IL’S CONQUEST OF IRAN 
In 1501 a young Sufi Shaykh named Isma’il was crowned the king or Shah of Iran 
and pronounced Ithna ‘Ashari or Twelver Shi’ism “to be the official religion of the newly 
established…Safavid state” (Savory, Iran Under 27). Isma’il’s declaration of Twelver 
Shi’ism as the official religion in mostly Sunni Iran is not important because he brought 
Shi’ism to a region that had never known the Shi’i faith. The Buyids (10th century C.E.), 
for example, ruled most of Iran at the behest of the Abbasid Caliph, and identified 
themselves as partisans of ‘Ali (Mottahedeh, Loyalty 187). The Buyids were not, 
however, adherents to the Twelver or Ithna ‘Ashuri sect of Shi’ism, instead they were 
Fiver or Zaidi Shi’is (Mottahedeh, Loyalty 13). The Zaidis maintain “that any ‘Alid 
(descendent of ‘Ali)” had the potential to become the Imam provided they made an effort 
to lead the Zaidi community politically (Mottahedeh, Loyalty 13). Even the Abbasid 
Caliphate (950-1258 C.E.) who controlled much of Iran had Shi’i leanings in its infancy 
(Garthwaite 122). 
The Mongol Ilkhans (13th-14th centuries C.E.), who ruled Iran after their conquest 
of the Abbasids, originally professed shamanistic beliefs, but were very tolerant of Islam 
in all of its incarnations (Garthwaite 143). When the Mongols did eventually convert to 
Islam they tended to favor both Sufism4 (Islamic Mysticism) and Shi’ism (Garthwaite 
4 For a general overview of the development of Sufism see Lapidus, A History 
of Islamic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.pgs 169-182. 
For more specific reading on Sufi’s in the Islamic Middle Period see Karamustafa, 
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143). The Mongols embrace of Sufism was not necessarily celebrated by all Muslims 
because Sufism, in the eyes of many Sunnis, was characterized by many practices such as 
“mendicancy, itinerancy, celibacy, and self-mortification” that were distinctly outside the 
realm of proper or orthodox belief structure (Karamustafa 2). For one Sunni theologian, 
Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taimiya (1263-1328 C.E.), the formerly pagan Mongols embrace 
of Sufism and Shi’ism confirmed his theories that most Sufi practices were un-Islamic 
(Homerin 223). 
The fall of the Mongols influence coincides with the rise of another nomadic 
conqueror named Timur (1336-1405). It appears that Timur, like his Mongol 
predecessors, favored Sufis in at least some capacity as he was reported to have sought 
the guidance of a Shaykh in Northern Iran while on campaign (Quinn, Historical Writing 
86-87). Although Timur may have had some mystical leanings, his descendants, 
according to Maria Eva Subtelny and Anas B. Khalidov, “professed adherence to 
Sunnism” despite the conception of Timurid of Iran as religiously “confused, complex, 
ambiguous, and ambivalent” (210). Moreover, it appears that under the reign of Timur’s 
son, Shah Rukh (1377-1447) that Sunnism underwent a “revival” in order to combat “the 
threat presented by the growth of extremist Shi’ite socio-religious movements (Khalidov 
and Subtelny 211). Iran still possessed some pockets of Shi’ism in cities like “Ray, Qum 
and Kashan,” but they could hardly be construed as an influential group within Iran 
God’s Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Middle Period 1200-1550. 
Oxford: Oneworld Press, 1994. Pgs 1-11. 
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(Khalidov and Subtelny 210). While there was a certain amount of religious 
“ambivalence” among Iran’s population during the Timurid period exposing a form of 
Sunnism with some “pro-‘Alid influences,” it was more a result of the Mongol’s religious 
tolerance than a form of Shi’ism (Khalidov and Subtelny 211). Timur’s reign brought 
some stability to Iran, but his death created a power struggle that plunged Iran back into 
fragmentation and social unease opening the door for “Shi’ite and Sufi ideas…[and] a 
messianism that was linked to the promise of the establishment of social justice” 
(Khalidov and Subtelny 211). 
During the reigns of the Mongols and Timurids, a Sufi order in Northwestern Iran 
was founded. The Safaviyya Sufi order was founded by Shaykh Safi al-Din in the early 
fourteenth century in the Iranian town of Ardabil and, like the Mongols and Timurids, 
professed a mystical approach to Islam (Quinn, Historical Writing 4). In fact, many of 
the later Mongol Ilkhans sought the guidance of the “Shaykhs of Ardabil” (Savory, Iran 
Under 10). Under the reign of Shaykh Safi the Safaviyya engaged in a “period of active 
proselytism” expanding the influence of the order “throughout Iran, Syria and Asia 
Minor” (Savory, Iran Under 8). The proselytism of the Safaviyya under Shaykh Safi and 
his immediate predecessors should not be confused with the order taking a political 
stance. If anything, the “mainstream or ‘high’ Sufism” exposed by the early Safavis was 
able to adapt and accommodate Iran’s irregular political scene (Turner 59). Shaykh Safi 
also made the leadership of the Safaviyya a hereditary right, passing the leadership of the 
order to his son upon his death (Savory, Iran Under 8-9). In 1494 C.E., upon the death of 
his father, the leadership of the Safaviyya was passed to Isma’il the great-great grandson 
of Shaykh Safi. 
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Isma’il’s conquest and subsequent embrace and propagation of Twelver Shi’ism 
is ultimately significant because of its historical impact on the Iranian religious 
landscape. The way in which Isma’il was able to accomplish his conversion does not 
come without raising some important questions. First is the question of how Isma’il, a 
twelve-year-old Sufi Shaykh, was able to conqueror Iran. Second, and perhaps equally if 
not more important, is the question of why did Isma’il embrace Shi’ism and lead what 
Arjomand calls, “the first successful Shi’ite revolution in Iran” in the first place 
especially in light of both the Safaviyya’s and Iran’s Sunni past (Arjomand, “History” 
113). Finally, what role did Shi’ism play in Isma’il’s military beginnings and in his 
ensuing rule as Shah? The point of this section will be to argue that Shah Isma’il ibn 
Haydar was able to instigate Shi’ite revolution in Iran because of his ability to draw on 
the charisma of the Imams and messianism inherent in the doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism. 
Both Barnes and Lindholm discuss the effect that a chaotic socio-political 
environment can have on charismatic individuals. Barnes for example, states that in 
times of stability a charismatic individual may be regarded with distain or ambivalence 
and perceived as “getting excited over nothing” (Barnes 4). Stability was certainly not a 
word that could be said to characterize most of the Safaviyya’s existence in Ardabil as 
Roger M. Savory notes that “the town of Ardabil itself changed hands many times on 
several occasions” creating an “adverse position” for the Safaviyya (Iran Under 11). In 
the years preceding the rise of Isma’il, two Turko-Mongol clans dominated the 
Safaviyya’s area of influence: the Aq-Qoyunlu (White Sheep) and the Qara-Qoyunlu 
(Black Sheep) who fought one another, and the Safaviyya for control of Northern Iran 
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(Quinn, Historical Writing 3). Eastern Iran was in a similar state of distress and de-
centralized rule due to infighting among the Timurids (Quinn, Historical Writing, 3). 
The relationship between the Safaviyya and their neighbors was not always 
violent, as in the case of marriages between the Aq-Qoyunlu and Isma’il’s father and 
grandfather (Morgan 109-110). Nevertheless, it was not long after his marriage that 
Isma’il’s father, Shaykh Haydar, was killed in battle by a rival power that was aided by 
the Aq-Qoyunlu (Morgan 110). Even Isma’il’s older brother, Shaykh ‘Ali, who took 
over the leadership of the Safaviyya after Haydar’s death, was killed shortly after his 
father (Savory, Iran Under 20). It is even reported that Shaykh ‘Ali, sensing his 
impending demise, “designated his brother Isma’il as his successor as head of the Safavid 
Order,” and told Isma’il to use his sword to “sweep unbelief from the face of the earth” 
(Savory, Iran Under 21). It is into the socio-political quagmire that was late fifteenth 
century Iran that Isma’il became the head of the Safaviyya order and all of those who 
looked to the Safavid Shaykh as a leader. 
Isma’il was charged with avenging his brother and father, and much of his early 
conquests reflect his vengeance on the Aq-Qoyunlu (Morgan 112). Conversely, as the 
head of the Safaviyya, Isma’il automatically received the loyalty of its Sufi disciplines, 
and the leading families of Ardabil who provided him with ample military support. The 
scope of Isma’il’s military campaigns and the extent to which his followers would go to 
ensure military success far outstripped the conquest and raids of his father and 
grandfather. Isma’il’s father and grandfather, Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar 
respectively, engaged in raids and border conflict (ghazi) with neighboring Christian 
communities, so the military wing of the Safaviyya was not unaccustomed to warfare 
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(Morgan 109-110). The core of the Safaviyya’s military was comprised of a group of 
Turkoman tribes collectively know as the Qizilbash (redheads) (Babayan, “The Safavid” 
138). The Qizilbash had been important members of the Safaviyya since the time of 
Shaykh Junayd, but it was under his grandson, Isma’il, that the relationship between the 
Safavid Shaykh and the Qizilbash reached its zenith. The logs of an Italian merchant 
who was traveling in Iran during Isma’il’s conquest record some of the practices of 
Isma’il’s solders as they expanded the Safavid’s influence. The traveler notes that 
Isma’il’s followers often, “enter[ed] into battle without armor, expecting their master 
Ismael to watch over them in the fight” (“A Narrative” 16). The Italian traveler continues 
writing, “the name of God is forgotten throughout Persia and that of Ismael [Isma’il] 
remembered” he also noted that Isma’il’s name often replaced that of the Prophet 
Muhammad in the traditional Muslim declaration of faith (shahadah) (“A Narrative” 16-
17). 
The statements put forth by the Italian traveler reveal a couple of things that 
differentiate Isma’il and his followers from the Safaviyya’s previous military endeavors. 
The practice of some of the Safaviyya’s followers engaging in armed conflict without the 
protection of armor based on a belief that Isma’il will protect them, certainly suggests a 
degree of faith and reverence in their leader that was outside the realm of the traditional 
Sufi Shaykh-discipline relationship. Beyond Isma’il’s role as a Sufi guide, is his own 
personal charisma that was established in military campaigns where he was referred to as 
“a lion wielding a dagger” (Sarwar 99). Isma’il was also a hunter of some renown killing 
a bear unaided at the age of thirteen (Sarwar 100). It was also at a young age (between 
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12 and 14 depending on the source) that Isma’il began his conquest of Iran, leading an 
army of “7,000 men” against the Shirwan Shah (Sarwar 100). 
Perhaps even more striking than Isma’il’s youth and ambition is the substitution 
of Isma’il for God and the Prophet Muhammad in many popular religious declarations of 
his followers. Kathryn Babayan suggests “Isma’il’s descent from the mystic Shaykh Safi 
al-Din had infused him with an aura of saintliness that…was intimately associated with 
Sufi culture” (“The Safavid” 135). Going beyond Isma’il’s authority as a Sufi Shaykh, is 
the nature of the Safaviyya itself at the time of Isma’il’s ascension, which had been 
transformed by ghulat or ghuluww belief structures (Babayan, “The Safavid” 136). It was 
under Isma’il’s grandfather, Shaykh Junayd, that the Safaviyya began to exhibit ghulat 
attributes after his wonderings among various heterodox groups in Anatolia (Morgan 
108-109). Ghulat or ghuluww beliefs have been translated in a number of ways, the most 
common of which being “Shi’i extremism” (Dakake 204). Babayan views the use of the 
ghulat or ghuluww not in terms of extremist belief, but rather in terms of “exaggerated” 
belief or an “approach to the apocalyptic horizon of [the] truth” (Mystics xv). For those 
who express ghulat tendencies “revelation never ceased” and “Muhammad was not the 
seal of the prophets” (Babayan, “The Safavid” 136). Colin Turner provides yet another 
insight in the definition of the ghulat, seeing it as a “partnership” between “’Ali and the 
Imams” and God based on a “preoccupation…with the created rather than the Creator” 
(58). 
Isma’il’s poetry (divan) presents not only an example of the nature of ghulat 
belief structures, but also a look into how Isma’il was able to grasp the charisma of the 
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Shi’i Imams. In his poetry (divan), Isma’il presents himself as the incarnation of many 
different figures and divine attributes. One example Isma’il writes: 
My name is Shah Isma’il. I am God’s mystery. I am the leader of all 
these ghazis. My mother is Fatima, my father is ‘Ali; and… I am the Pir 
[guide/father] of the twelve Imams…In me is Prophethood (and) the 
mystery of Holiness. I follow the path of Muhammad Mustafa [The 
Twelfth Imam] (Minorsky and Isma’il 1042). 
In these passages Isma’il establishes himself as a prophetic figure in the vein of 
the Shi’i Imams. Furthermore, Isma’il claims that he is not only a Shi’i figure of some 
importance, but he is in fact one of the Imams himself. In another poem, Isma’il claims 
that he, like the Shi’i Imams, existed from “Pre-Eternity” (Minorsky and Isma’il 1044). 
In yet another example from Isma’il’s poetry (divan), Isma’il expands the context of his 
religious claims by presenting himself as the prophesized Mahid, returning to lead the 
righteous: 
By the Lord! Come and behold: God’s light has reappeared; Muhammad 
Mustafa [the Twelfth Imam], the Seal of the Prophets has come! 
The Perfect guide has arrived. Faith has been (brought) to all. 
A man (has become) a manifestation of Truth. Prostrate thyself! 
Pander not to Satan! Adam has put on new clothes, God has come. 
The Guiding Imam has come! Seize his hand, show him the way. 
(Minorsky and Isma’il 1049). 
In some respects, Isma’il goes even further than claiming that he is the Mahdi, 
identifying himself as both Adam and God. Such exaggerated claims of divinity help to 
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explain the religious message of Isma’il and his Qizilbash followers is often interpreted 
as being so far outside the realm of Twelver Shi’i Islamic belief that it cannot be 
categorized as such. David Morgan for example, correctly notes that “reverence for ‘Ali 
and the Shi’i imams was not seen, in the fifteenth century, as being incompatible with 
something approximating to orthodox Sunni belief” (109). Babayan, in a paper analyzing 
the evolution of the Safavids from Sufi order to imperial dynasty, terms the religious 
movement of the early Safavids as “Qizilbash Islam” differentiating it from the orthodox 
Twelver Shi’ism that defined the Safavids after Isma’il (“The Safavid” 135-136). 
Qizilbash Islam refers to a version of Islam which incorporated elements from “Sufi, 
‘Alid [reverence for ‘Ali and his progeny], ghulat and Turco-Mongol cultures” (Babayan, 
“The Safavid” 136). Turner also suggests that the Safavid movement is an amalgamation 
of “Sufism and ghulat extremism” (58). Babayan and Turner’s summaries of the 
Safavids religious policies are at least, in the case of Isma’il, more appropriate than 
Morgan’s, because the message of Isma’il’s poetry is not one of reverence for the Imams, 
but one of personification and embodiment of the Imams. The adoption of a red twelve-
gored Turkish hat by the Safaviyya serves as a fine example of the synthesis that 
Babayan and Turner suggest, as each fold in the hat was said to represent each of the 
Twelve Shi’i Imams (“A Narrative” 17). It is from this hat the Isma’il’s followers 
received that title “Qizilbash” or redheads in Turkish (Quinn, Historical Writing 4-5). 
The arguments of Babayan, Turner, and even Morgan are all valid to a point, as 
they provide a solid historical basis for explaining and analyzing the religiosity of the 
early Safavids. Shahzad Bashir provides an explanation for the beliefs of the Safavids, 
and Isma’il in particular, that is based on an understanding of the religious connotations 
Henderson 57 
of taking on the mantle of the Mahdi. Bashir writes that “being a Mahdi in a Shi’i 
context necessarily requires going beyond traditional belief” (“The Imams Return” 21). 
Bashir’s analysis of Shi’ite messianism throws new light on Isma’il’s claims and his 
mission. If Bashir’s notion of the Mahdi superseding more conventional belief structures 
is accepted, then the religiosity of Isma’il and his Qizilbash followers is easier to 
quantify. Furthermore, the cultural and religious synthesis that Babayan and Turner 
present as an explanation for the religiosity of the early Safavids can be viewed in terms 
of the innovation and expansion of belief that an individual claiming to be the Mahdi 
demanded. Viewing Isma’il as a claimant to the Mahdi, as his poetry certainly suggests, 
finds further fault with Morgan’s view of the early Safavids religiosity stemming from 
the popular worship of ‘Ali during the fifteenth century. If anything, Isma’il’s 
declaration of himself as the Mahdi shows an early indication of a distinctly Shi’i mindset 
that Isma’il built upon after conquering Iran. In claiming to be the Shi’i Mahdi, Isma’il 
was able to “access the charisma inscribed in traditions regarding the Twelfth Imam in 
order to acquire spiritual and political power through the claim” (Bashir, “The Imams 
Return” 21). The ability to draw on the charisma of the Mahdi creates a tremendous pull 
towards the “salvation” inherent in “the acclaimed leader thus invested with mahdistic 
authority” (Arjomand, The Shadow 82). In claiming to be the Mahdi, Isma’il was able to 
charismatically outshine the political and religious forces of the day by creating a 
personal relationship between himself (the sacred) and his followers (the profane) 
(Arjomand, The Shadow 83). 
The question now becomes to what end did Isma’il direct his followers after 
establishing himself as the Mahdi. Arjomand acknowledges that Shah Isma’il’s poetry 
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was almost certainly targeted at his Turkoman disciplines because they were composed in 
the “Turkish of the Turkmans” as opposed to Persian the traditional “literary” language 
of the period (The Shadow 81). The report from the Italian merchant quoted above 
provides some insight into the dealings of the Safavids, acknowledging their penchant for 
conflict and expansion. The Italian merchant’s reports of the use of Isma’il’s name in 
place of that of the Prophet Muhammad and even God now make more sense if it is 
accepted that Isma’il was viewed as the Mahdi. 
The reports of the Qizilbash entering battle without armor, in addition to the 
bloodthirsty behavior of the Qizilbash as they conquered Iran, imply an application of 
charisma in a distinctly Weberian model. As the revealed Imam, Isma’il drew upon the 
unique gifts and heritage inherent associated with the Shi’i Imam’s separating himself 
from his followers due to what Weber defines as specified access to the “supernatural” 
(Weber 19). In examining Isma’il’s effect on his Qizilbash followers, a number of Dow’s 
comments on Weber’s theories appear especially relevant. Dow, in recognizing the 
“Dionysian” quality of charisma, writes that charismatic authority can more correctly be 
stated not in terms of Weber’s gift of grace but as “grace of divinity divested of morality” 
because of the unrestricted nature of the power derived from charismatic authority (84). 
The effect of Isma’il’s charismatic authority on the Qizilbash, as reported by the Italian 
traveler, indicates Dow’s conception of grace freed of morality. When Isma’il sacked 
Tabriz and secured his hold over most of Northwestern Iran it is reported that the 
Qizilbash “massacred many of the inhabitants,” including the pregnant women “with 
their unborn offspring” (“A Narrative” 14). Isma’il himself is said to have ordered the 
beheading of his mother (in his presence) when he learned that she had married one of his 
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enemies in Tabriz (“A Narrative” 15). Other tales of the Safavid’s conquest under 
Isma’il contain references to pyramids being erected out of human skulls and Isma’il 
fashioning a drinking cup out of “the skull of Shaybani Khan” (Sarwar 100). Perhaps 
even more revealing of Isma’il’s charismatic effect on his followers is reports of the 
Qizilbash engaging in cannibalistic activity at Isma’il’s behest. Safavid chronicler, 
Sayyid Yahya Qazvini, reports that the Qizilbash reportedly roasted Aq Quyunlu chief 
Murad Beg over a fire and “devoured his flesh” (qtd. in Bashir, “Shah Isma’il” 236). 
Bashir views the acts of anthropophagy by the Qizilbash as representative of the 
“Qizilbash’s religious relationship with Shah Isma’il” (“Shah Isma’il” 240). Within 
Bashir’s religious context, the act of cannibalism by the Qizilbash reinforces the 
“sincerity of their belief” in Isma’il, who demanded such action in order to view the 
devotion of his followers (“Shah Isma’il” 240). 
The cannibalism of the Qizilbash can also be explained in terms of its charismatic 
religious context, which reflects much of what Dow describes as charismas ability to 
abolish “all notions of sanctity” (83). The Qizilbash’s literal consumption of Shah 
Isma’il’s foes powerfully illustrates the outlets for the amoral tendencies of charisma that 
Dow describes. Moreover, Isma’il’s relationship with the Qizilbash appears to have 
been constantly redefined and refreshed in a manner that confirms Barnes’ argument for 
religious charisma being defined by the relationship between a charismatic religious 
figure and their followers (2). Isma’il’s military success as an “activist” Mahdi was, 
therefore, made possible by the “allegiance of the Qizilbash tribesman to the Safavid 
order” (Bashir, Messianic Hopes 73-74). Conversely, the degree of bloodshed that 
Isma’il and the Qizilbash engaged in, and the scope of their conquest, which went beyond 
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that of any previous Safavid Shaykhs implies that Isma’il was acting on some higher 
instinct, a drive to create “a just utopia” for his brand of exaggerated Shi’ism in Iran 
(Babayan, “The Safavid” 140). Isma’il’s role as a “holy warrior” cannot also be 
underestimated because of his claimant to the office of the Mahdi (Babayan, Mystics 
299). As the Mahdi, Isma’il’s conquests took on a religious connotation, in which he 
brought the true version of Islam to the “Eastern lands of Islam” which had suffered 
under political “oppression and [improper religious] innovation” (Babayan, Mystic 299). 
According to Arjomand, the “political decentralization” of the period directly preceding 
the advent of the Safavids as an imperial dynasty paved the way for Mahdist-messianic 
movements such as Isma’il’s (The Shadow 82). 
Isma’il crowned himself “Shah” or King of Iran in 1501 in Tabriz, the former 
capital of his Aq Quyunlu enemies (Arjomand, The Shadow 109). At the time of his 
coronation, Isma’il had not conquered Iran in its entirety, having only assumed control 
over most of Northwestern Iran (Rumlu 24-25). Nevertheless, within just a few short 
years of Isma’il’s adoption of the traditional Persian title of Shah, he had regained much 
of the territory of the pre-Islamic Sassanid Empire (Newman, Safavid Iran 1-2). 
Moreover, most historians acknowledge 1501 as the beginning of the Safavid Empire, 
marking the transformation of the Safaviyya from a Sufi order to imperial dynasty 
(Newman, Safavid Iran 2). An account of Isma’il’s coronation reveals a number of 
interesting points that are relevant to Isma’il’s Mahdist claims and the Shi’ite revolution 
that he fostered after becoming Shah and, as such, warrants reprinting here: 
On Friday, the exalted king [Isma’il] went to the congregational mosque 
of Tabriz and ordered its preacher, who was one of the Shi’ite dignitaries, 
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to mount the pulpit. The king himself proceeded to the front of the pulpit, 
unsheathed the sword of the Lord of Time [The Mahdi], may peace be 
upon him, and stood there like the shining sun (qtd. in Arjomand, The 
Shadow 109). 
This account contains a few references to Isma’il being the prophesied Mahdi, namely, 
his possession of the sword of the Mahdi and his illuminated presence. The liking of 
Isma’il to the sun could also contain a subtle Persian subtext possibly hinting at the 
ancient Persian notion farr. 
In Quinn’s analysis of the dream narratives of Shaykh Safi al-Din there are a 
number of references to the divine-charismatic-Persian aura of farr. Shaykh Safi is said 
to have had a powerful, prophetic dream about the rise of a world-conquering king from 
his line and light is said to have surrounded the head of the King indicating the “pre-
Islamic Zoroastrain/Sasnian” notions of farr (Quinn, Historical Writing 69). It was only 
natural for the chroniclers of Shah Isma’il to adapt the tales of Shaykh Safi’s dreams to 
Isma’il’s rise to power (Quinn, “The Dreams of” 138). Isma’il himself appears to have 
been familiar with Persian concepts and figures despite his Turkoman leanings, as he 
claimed to be a number of Persian historical figures in his poetry (divan) (Minorsky and 
Isma’il 1047). The idea of Isma’il being surrounded by farr is further referenced in the 
work of later Safavid chroniclers such as Iskander Bek Munshi, who was active during 
the reign of Isma’il’s great-grandson (‘Abbas I) indicate that Isma’il was perceived to 
have been in possession of the Persian concept of charismatic kingship appropriated by 
later Safavid rulers (41). When writing of the young Isma’il, Munshi notes that, “the 
divine glory [farr] shone forth from his [Isma’il’s] face” (41). Much like his appeal to 
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Shi’i notions of pre-existence and the establishment of a world in accord with the 
Imam’s justice, Isma’il incorporating distinctly Persian pillars of legitimacy such as the 
adoption of Shah, and an emphasis on Persian heroic figures and his association farr was 
an effort to secure his imperial rule. 
The presence of “Shi’ite dignitaries” at Isma’il’s coronation is even more 
interesting, and holds a great deal of significance for the future of Iran. That fact that 
Shi’i clerics participated in any event with Isma’il is perplexing as there was often 
“tension” between those who claimed to be Mahdis and the Mujtahids or scholars who 
lead the orthodox Shi’i community (Bashir, “The Imams Return” 21). The conflict that 
arises between a Mahdi and the Mujtahids stems from the Mahdi being perceived as “the 
gravest transgressor against accepted [Shi’i] dogma” by the Mujtahids while those who 
claim to be the Mahdi view themselves as “Shi’ism’s greatest hope” (Bashir, Messianic 
Hopes 28). Another Mahdi of the fiftieth century, Muhammad Nurbakhsh writes 
“Mujtahids are leaders of the people concerned only with the exterior (ahl-i zahir). They 
are people of doubt” who often mislead the people (qtd. in Bashir, “The Imams Return” 
21). Nurbakhsh’s argues that the great religious revelations and innovations of the world 
were not the products of religious scholars but those of “saints” and “master of unveiling 
(kashf)” who intrinsically “know the truth (haqiqat) of things” (qtd. in Bashir, “The 
Imams Return” 21). Bashir observes that the Mujtahids, as “the guardians of traditional 
religion” were, therefore, very likely to be vilified by claimants to the Mahdi, and, 
conversely, to malign these “Mahdis” themselves (“The Imams Return” 21). Yet, in the 
instance of Isma’il’s coronation, it seems that Mahdi and Mujtahid were working 
together. The cooperation of the Shi’i Mujtahids with Isma’il can be explained by 
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Isma’il’s proclamation to “convert Iran to Twelver Shi’sim,” and to make Twelver 
Shi’ism “the state religion of his empire” after his coronation (Arjomand, The Shadow 
109). Despite Isma’il’s pronouncements, he did not directly renounce his Mahdist 
claims, nor did the Qizilbash cease to revere him as such. Nevertheless, Isma’il, in 
adopting Twelver Shi’ism as the state religion of his empire and making a commitment 
to convert the population of Iran to this particular brand of Shi’ism, instigated a 
revolution both for Shi’ism and for Iran. 
For Shi’ism, Isma’il’s proclamation was revolutionary because for the first time 
since the Imamates of ‘Ali, Hassan, and Husayn, Shi’ism became associated with a 
defined political presence. In order to accommodate such a shift, some of the doctrines 
of Twelver Shi’ism were adapted to fill its new role as a source of legitimacy and 
imperial prestige (Momen 107). One such change to the traditional cannon of the 
Twelver Shi’is concerned who had to right to lead the community in the absence of the 
rightful Imam. Traditionally, the Mujtahids or legal scholars had led the Twelver Shi’i 
community since the occultation of the Twelfth Imam (Momen 99). While the Qizilbash 
viewed Isma’il as the Mahdi and, therefore, the rightful ruler and just Imam, the Shi’i 
Mujtahids viewed Isma’il’s Mahdist claims with suspicion that characterized their 
reaction to most claimants to the office of the Mahdi (Momen 108). Isma’il was, 
however, allowed to continue his conquest as the Mahdi because Iran lacked any 
prominent Shi’i clerics or ‘ulama to effectively mount religious opposition to Isma’il 
(Momen 108). The lack of Shi’i clerics in Iran at the time of Isma’il’s conquest was 
further indicative of the religiosity of Iran’s population who were predominantly Sunni 
at the time of Isma’il’s conquest. Isma’il used the appropriated charisma of the Twelfth 
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Imam to lead his devoted Qizilbash followers to victory in the chaotic socio-political 
scene that comprised Iran in the early sixteenth century. Once he began to secure the 
Iranian plateau, Isma’il began what this work will categorize as a process of 
revolutionary routinization, in which he transformed Iran from a group of warring Sunni 
states into a unified Shi’i Empire. 
Isma’il’s revolutionary routinization is based in part on his rejection of his 
Mahdist claim in order to adopt the tenets of the Twelver Shi’ism and found an imperial 
dynasty. The change in Isma’il’s claim is subtle, with it being argued that, “Isma’il 
[was] guided by the Imams rather than embodying the awaited twelfth Imam himself” 
(Babayan, Mystics 301). Isma’il adapted his ruling title to fit his new image as one who 
ruled on behalf of the Imams. Instead of Mahdi, Isma’il took the Persian title of Shah 
and drew on a Sasanain notion of the Shah as the “Shadow of God on Earth” (Arjomand, 
The Shadow 95). It also appears that Isma’il recognized that the zealous loyalty that his 
divine status and charisma granted him ultimately proved to be a “liability” after he had 
succeeded in conquering Iran (Arjomand, The Shadow 110). Isma’il even sentenced 
some “fanatical devotees” to death, and became displeased when he was called “God or 
a Prophet” (Arjomand, The Shadow 110). The unreliability of the Qizilbash was 
especially evident after the Ottoman defeat of Isma’il’s army at the battle of Chaldiran. 
Savory notes that Isma’il’s defeat at Chaldiran “destroyed the legend of his 
invincibility,” and caused the Qizilbash to lose “their faith in Isma’il’s supernatural 
powers” (“The Principal Offices” 91). The fallout from Chaldiran not only confirms 
Weber’s theories regarding the “instability” inherent in charismatic leadership, but also 
illustrates the importance, and ultimately the success, of Isma’il’s process of 
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routinization because the Safavid dynasty endured and even prospered after his defeat 
(Weber 22). 
Equally, Isma’il’s mystical Sufi upbringing did not prepare him for a role as a 
leader in the orthodox Shi’i community. This is not to say that Isma’il was completely 
ignorant of concrete aspects of Islam, as he had studied the Qur’an with a teacher as a 
child (Rumlu 4). Moreover, Isma’il’s religiosity certainly had defined Shi’i elements, as 
evident in the reverence for the Shi’i Imams in his poetry. Moreover, later versions of 
Isma’il’s poetry “omit verses” in which Isma’il labels himself the Mahdi in an effort to 
display his dedication to a less exaggerated interpretation of Shi’ism. There is also the 
fact that Isma’il chose to adopt orthodox Twelver Shi’ism, and even “concocted” a 
genealogy that traced his ancestry to that of the Twelver Imams (Babayan, “The 
Safavid” 136). 
Nevertheless, it appears that Isma’il’s personal religiosity and the religiosity of 
the Qizilbash were characterized more by anti-Sunni actions that doctrinally precise 
Shi’ism (Momen 109). As such, excessive veneration of ‘Ali, and the cursing of ‘Ali’s 
enemies, were reportedly very common amongst the Qizilbash (Momen 109). Turner 
categorizes the Shi’ism of Isma’il and the Qizilbash as “Shi’ism with a predominantly 
externalist flavour [sic],”(58). By this statement, Turner means that Isma’il’s version of 
Shi’ism was comprised of specific actions and exaggeration of certain Shi’i tenets, as 
opposed to scholarly-legal based form of Shi’ism (58). After Isma’il’s coronation in 
1501, he begins to adopt a more orthodox position in order to distance himself from the 
religiosity of the Qizilbash. The point of establishing the religiosity of Isma’il and his 
Safavid cohorts is to show that in order to realize a process of revolutionary 
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routinization, in which Isma’il accomplished his Shi’ite revolution by channeling his 
Mahdist charisma into a process of religious conversion and empire building in Iran. 
In order to accomplish his revolution, Shah Isma’il turned to a number of 
prominent Arab-Shi’i clerics (‘ulama) for guidance. As noted in the previous 
paragraphs, the number of Shi’i Mujtahids, or experts in Twelver Shi’i law and doctrine, 
in Iran were not conducive to mounting an effective resistance to Isma’il’s Mahdist 
claim, let alone serving as successful agents of religious conversion (Momen 108). In 
order to bolster the ranks of Shi’i ‘ulama in Iran, Isma’il “invited renowned Twelver 
Shi’ite ‘ulama…from Arabic-speaking countries,” with “Iraq, Bahrain and [the] Jabal 
‘Amil in Syria” providing most of the émigrés (Abisaab 8). According to Rula Jurdi 
Abisaab, it was from the Jabal ‘Amil area of Syria/Lebanon that the “foremost” Shi’i 
scholars arrived (8). The number of Shi’i ‘ulama that immigrated to Iran in response to 
Isma’il’s invitation is the subject of great debate in the area of Safavid studies (Babayan, 
“The Safavid” 140). Andrew Newman for example, rejects the analysis of many Safavid 
scholars, which claims that after Isma’il’s institution of Twelver Shi’ism a “large” 
number of Arab Shi’i clerics promptly moved to Safavid Iran (“The Myth” 66). 
Newman argues that while a few Twelver clerics did in fact throw in their lot with the 
Safavids, the bulk of the clerics viewed Safavid Iran as an “unorthodox amalgamation of 
non-Shi’i and Shi’i religious expression” (“The Myth” 67). Moreover, many of the Arab 
Twelver Shi’i clerics were concerned with Isma’il’s sudden “interest in and conversion 
to the faith,” especially considering the religiosity that characterized Isma’il’s early years 
(Newman, “The Myth” 68). 
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Newman’s points are valid; however, there is some recent scholarship, most 
notably that of Abisaab, that confirms the more established claims favoring more 
interchange between Arab Shi’i clerics and the Safavids under Isma’il (Abisaab 16). It 
should be noted that the number of immigrant Shi’i clerics that Abisaab suggests do 
seem to be lower than those suggested by Arjomand and his early works (Arjomand, The 
Shadow 130-131). Abisaab also points out that it was becoming increasing difficult for 
the Shi’i ‘ulama of the Jabil ‘Amil region to find work and support their families under 
the auspices of the increasingly Sunni Ottomans (22). Moreover, those Shi’i scholars 
who did move to Iran often received salaries and lucrative land grants (Abisaab 22). 
What both Newman and other Safavid scholars can and do agree on is the significance 
attached to Shaykh ‘Ali al-Karaki, a Twelver Shi’i mujtahid who immigrated to Iran 
from the Jabal ‘Amil at Shah Isma’il’s behest (Newman, “The Myth” 67, Abisaab 9, 
Babayan, Mystics 306). 
Al-Karaki is important because he provided a degree of legalistic Shi’i legitimacy 
to Isma’il’s Shi’i revolution. Al-Karaki, as a mujtahid, was able to provide Isma’il with 
the religious expertise necessary to further his plans for Iran’s conversion to Shi’ism 
(Abisaab 16). Naturally, one of the first steps taken by the Isma’il and al-Karaki in the 
conversion was a campaign to discredit many Sunni scholars combined with a general 
denouncement of Sunnism in general (Abisaab 16). Al-Karaki was particularly fond of 
bringing converts to Shi’ism by publicly denouncing aspects of Sunni theology “among 
both Sunnites and Shi’ites so as to bring converts to Twelver Shi’ism based on their 
freely chosen, unequivocal adherence to the rightful cause of the Imams” (Abisaab 16-
17). Al-Karaki’s methods appear to have been more effective in bringing willing 
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converts to Shi’ism than the attempts of Isma’il, who favored a more forceful approach 
to conversion (Abisaab 21). At the same time that they were attacking the bases of 
Sunnism in Iran, Isma’il and al-Karaki also went after ghulat and Sufi groups who were 
perceived as impeding the spread of Shi’ism in Iran (Arjomand, The Shadow 110-112). 
Shah Isma’il saw the usefulness of the Friday prayers to promote his rule, and insisted 
that al-Karaki use the Friday prayer as an outlet to spread Shi’i theology and the unique 
brand of state Shi’ism that al-Karaki and Isma’il had created (Abisaab 21). The title and 
role of the Safavid Shahs was profoundly shaped by al-Karaki who gave Shah Isma’il 
the title of imam al-adil or “just Imam,” thus “playing on the double entendre embedded 
in this designation that denoted both the hidden Imam [the Mahdi] as well as the just 
temporal ruler” (Babayan, Mystics 306). Al-Karaki also developed and extended the 
role of the Shi’i ‘ulama in Safavid Iran making them the “general representatives” of the 
Imams; paving the way for close relationship between the Shi’i ‘ulama and the temporal 
rulers of Iran from the Safavids onward (Babayan, Mystics 307). Babayan views the 
reforms of al-Karaki as a “theoretical revolution in Imami [Twelver Shi’i] doctrine,” in 
which the Shi’i ‘ulama as “arbiter[s] of Shi’i doctrines and practices” began to embody 
the will of the Imams (Mystics 307). Al-Karaki was able to accomplish all of these 
reforms because of the support of Shah Isma’il and his desire to rule a Shi’i Iran. 
Isma’il may have renounced his role as the Mahdi after he had succeeded in 
conquering Iran, but his Mahdist image allowed him to gather a large group of zealous 
followers and, subsequently, to channel their devotion into his drive to create a ideal 
social and religious society. The appropriated charisma of the Shi’i Imams allowed 
Isma’il to place Iran under centralized rule for the first time since the Islamic conquests 
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of the seventh century. Conversely, Isma’il’s position as Shah of Iran allowed him to 
proclaim Twelver Shi’ism as the religion of his new state whose population was 
predominantly Sunni. The Shi’i ‘ulama, both imported and native, were ultimately the 
recipients of Isma’il’s charisma. The elaboration of Shi’i doctrines by al-Karaki and his 
ilk, and the successful conversion of most of Iran’s population to Twelver Shi’ism, 
exemplifies the success of the routinization of Isma’il’s Mahdist charisma and the 
triumph of the first Shi’ite revolution. 
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IV. THE SECOND SHI’ITE REVOLUTION: KHOMEINI AND 20th CENTURY IRAN 
Events in sixteenth century Iran changed many aspects of long-held Shi’i 
doctrines as the Safavids ushered in a revolution of Shi’i conversion, creating, for the first 
time, an imperial state in which most of its subjects were Shi’i (Arjomand, “History” 
113). Under the Safavids, Shi’ism became an imperial religion, limiting the charismatic 
guise of “Imami [Twelver] legitimacy” to the Shah and the “religious scholars [‘ulama]” 
(Babayan, Mystics 374). In other words, the Shi’i jurist of the Safavid era exercised 
considerably more influence in the political realm than their predecessors. The 
coronation of each Safavid Shah serves as a salient example of the relationship between 
the Safavid Shah and the Shi’i ‘ulama, as each successive Shah was crowned by a 
prominent member of the Shi’i religious institution (Turner 164). There was also a great 
deal of intermarriage between the Safavid elite and important Shi’i clerics “linking the 
fate of the crown (taj) with that of the turban (‘amamah) (Babayan, Mystics 382). 
Despite the close relationship between the Safavid Shah and the extensive network of 
Shi’i clerics that had developed in Iran with the aid of Safavid patronage, the Shi’i ‘ulama 
of Iran still maintained a quietist position (Arjomand, “History” 113). After the fall of 
the Safavids, Iran’s Shi’i ‘ulama adopted more a quietist path, concerning themselves 
with purely religious matters such as Islamic law and were, with a few exceptions, 
generally accepting of the Shah’s rule provided he sought their guidance on all matters 
sacred (Babayan, Mystics 404-405). There are, however, a few events in Iranian history 
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under the reign of the Qajar dynasty (1795-1925) that display some significant 
developments in the Shi’i ‘ulama that warrant mention. 
The first event in Iran’s history to really display the power of the Shi’i ‘ulama 
after the Safavid period is the Tobacco protest or revolt of 1891. The Tobacco protest 
was instigated at the behest of a group of Shi’i clerics, the most notable of which being 
Ayatollah Hajj Mirza Hassan Shirazi, over the sale of tobacco concessions to a number of 
British companies (Keddie 61). Tobacco was a profitable crop for many Iranian farmers 
and landowners who, in turn, financially supported much of the religious establishment 
(Moaddel, “Shi’i Political” 459). It was then only natural that the clerical front became 
upset when the Qajar Shah made a deal with England to export all of Iran’s tobacco to a 
British company (Moaddel, “Shi’i Political” 459). In response Ayatollah Shirazi issued a 
fatwa or legal opinion “prohibiting smoking,” which resulted in a boycott of tobacco 
products by Iranian Shi’i Muslims (Moaddel, “The Shi’i” 529-530). Ayatollah Shirazi, 
who was exiled to Iraq for his actions, wrote to the Shah that the European manner of 
banking and the Shah’s concessions to such a system was anathema to Islamic principles 
and should therefore be revoked (Moaddel, “Shi’i Political” 460). Whether or not 
Ayatollah Shirazi’s legal reasoning had any effect on the Shah’s decision is unclear, what 
is clear, however, is the effect of Shirazi’s fatwa, which resulted in a “successful 
nationwide boycott on the sale and use of tobacco” in Iran (Keddie 61). It is reported that 
even the Qajar Shah’s wives abstained from tobacco use while Shirazi’s fatwa was in 
effect (Keddie 61). A boycott of such a scale made the concession unpalatable and 
unprofitable for all parties involved, and led to a cancelation of the tobacco concession by 
the Shah in 1892 (Keddie 62). The power which Ayatollah Shirazi wielded through his 
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fatwa shows that while the Shi’i ‘ulama of Iran were not directly involved in politics they 
still commanded authority through religious declarations. The rulings of Ayatollah 
Shirazi are also significant because they represent the successful application of the 
opinion of one cleric in the face of dissenting opinions by other Shi’i clerics, thus 
demonstrating how the power and influence of a clerics can draw through their religious 
knowledge and message (Moaddel, “The Shi’i” 530). 
The Iranian constitutional revolution of 1905-1906 represents another instance of 
the involvement of Iran’s Shi’i ‘ulama and, much like the tobacco rebellion before it, is 
defined by an alliance between ‘ulama and merchants against the Shah (Keddie 67). In 
the case of the constitutional revolution, the Mullahs (a popular Iranian term for Shi’i 
clerics) and the merchants demanded the Shah form a “representative assembly or 
majles” (Keddie 67). The point of the Majles was to develop a constitutional monarchy 
in Iran, in addition to providing protection of certain rights and personal freedoms 
(Keddie 68). Like the tobacco rebellion the constitutional revolution was lead by a 
prominent Shi’i mujtahid: Ayatollah Mohammad Tabataba’i (Keddie 67). Ayatollah 
Tabataba’i was profoundly interested in allowing Iranian society to run as smoothly as 
possible while eliminating “foreign penetration” (Moaddel, “The Shi’i” 531). The 
constitutional revolution was successful to a point, as it did result in the creation of the 
Majles and a constitution. Yet, the Majles itself was prone to corruption and the 
freedoms guaranteed by the constitution were often ignored by the Shah (Keddie 68-69). 
Moreover, while there was significant support among the ‘ulama for the constitutional 
revolution (some even served in the Majles), there were still many who viewed the 
‘ulama’s involvement as going against their traditional role (Moaddel, “The Shi’i” 531). 
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Both the tobacco rebellion and the constitutional revolution share a number of 
similarities. One of the more salient similarities is the alliance between the Shi’i ‘ulama 
and a group of merchants against the Shah in the hopes of correcting some aspect of 
society. The Islamic Revolution, as will be shown, represents a revolution that changed, 
not one aspect of society, but the political and religious landscape of Iran. 
Judging by events in the latter half of the twentieth century, it appears that some 
fundamental changes had occurred both in Iran, and in terms of what role of the Shi’i 
jurist should play in the political sphere. In November of 1979 C.E. a prominent Shi’i 
cleric named Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini (1902-1989) became the “de jure” leader of 
Iran “on behalf of the Hidden Imam” (Arjomand, The Turban 139). Arjomand 
characterizes Khomeini’s takeover of the Iranian political sphere in terms of a “clerical 
coup d’état,” in which the democratic elements of Iran’s government were exercised in 
favor of Islamic law (shari’ah) and theocratic-clerical rule (The Turban 137-139). The 
events in Iran that lead up to the clerical takeover are now known as the Islamic 
Revolution, facilitated by a number of groups including, but not limited to, the Shi’i 
‘ulama (Keddie 222). Nevertheless, it is the visage of Ayatollah Khomeini that 
permeates most discussions of the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent founding of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. The intention of this section is to argue that Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution in 1979 represents a second Shi’ite revolution facilitated by a charismatic-
Shi’i figure that drew upon the suspended charisma of the Shi’i Imams. The life of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini and his doctrinal elaboration will serve as the 
primary focus of this section’s analysis. 
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As noted in the previous chapters, the position and circumstances of the Shi’i 
‘ulama changed dramatically after both the occultation of the Twelfth Imam and after the 
rise of the Safavid dynasty in Iran. Iran’s Islamic Revolution marks yet another such 
shift, however; the Islamic Revolution is different in that it is not simply a revolution that 
forced the Shi’i ‘ulama of Iran to react to set of circumstances, but a revolution that was 
brought to a head by the Shi’i ‘ulama themselves. Events in late ninetieth and early 
twentieth century Iran establish some precedent for the involvement of Iran’s Shi’i clerics 
in politics; however, they do not compare to the 1979 revolution in terms of the scope of 
the revolution and the involvement of the religious establishment. 
Ayatollah Khomeini was born into relatively humble beginnings in the Iranian 
village of Khomein (Moin 1). According to Baqer Moin, Khomeini was “a particularly 
striking boy of above average build” who favored games were he could play the role of 
the ruler, and dole out punishment to bandits (2). As a young boy Khomeini developed a 
passion for learning, and is reported to have memorized a great number of religious and 
classical Persian texts very quickly (Moin 18). In his teenage years Khomeini entered the 
seminary or madraseh studying with Ayatollah Ha’eri, a prominent Shi’i cleric who was 
against Mullahs getting involved in politics (Moin 22). Khomeini followed Ha’eri to a 
madraseh in the Iranian city of Qum, home to a popular Shi’i shrine, and bastion of 
Iranian-Shi’i learning (Moin 25). With the arrival Ayatollah Ha’eri, Qum underwent a 
renaissance in terms of its importance as a center religious learning (Moin 25). The 
growth of Qum in the 1920s was also fueled by a steady flow of Shi’i clerics from Najaf, 
Iraq, who had been expelled by the British (Moin 25). With resources and talented 
students and teachers at his disposal Ayatollah Ha’eri “set about laying the foundations of 
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a major religious institution” drawing even more talent to the new center of Iranian 
Shi’ism (Moin 25). 
Qum’s renaissance was to be relatively short lived due to a coup lead by a 
military leader named Reza Khan. Reza Khan seized Tehran in 1921 with the aid of his 
“Russian-officered Cossack brigade” and eventually crowned himself Shah, ruling as a 
dictator until he was forced by Russia and Britain to abdicate in 1941 (Zirinsky 639). 
Many within the ranks of the Shi’i ‘ulama feared that Reza Khan sought to form a 
republic like Turkey, and would have secularized Iran’s population (Ghods, “Iranian” 
41). In order to counter the perceived threat of republicanism to Islam many Shi’i clerics 
supported Reza Khan’s bid for Shah (Ghods, “Iranian” 43). Despite the Shi’i ‘ulama’s 
attempts to distill threats of secularism, Reza Shah’s reign was, nevertheless, marked by a 
number of “government initiatives” that sought to “direct Iran’s emergence into the 
twentieth century” (Ghods, “Government” 219). Reza Shah’s vision of a “modern” Iran 
did not include the Shi’i ‘ulama, who he felt “symbolized backwardness” (Chehabi 225). 
Because of their perceived “backwardness,” Reza Shah cut the Shi’i ‘ulama off from the 
educational and legal systems that had been under control for centuries (Ghods, 
“Government” 224-225). Instead, Reza Shah placed a great deal of importance on the 
military and the modernizing potential that a military education provided (Ghods, 
“Government” 223). Reza Shah also adopted the “surname of Pahlavi” in order to reflect 
his desire to return Iran to the perceived “glory” of its pre-Islamic past (Arjomand, The 
Turban 62). 
The effectiveness of Reza Shah’s reforms are subject to some debate because of 
their varied results. His military and educational reforms for example increased the size 
Henderson 76 
and competence of the military while increasing literacy rates, but the literacy rates were 
not tremendously higher than the rates before Reza Shah’s reforms (Ghods, “Government 
223-224). There was also a great deal of disillusionment with Iranian society in general 
because of a lack of social mobility, even with military experience and an educational 
background (Ghods, “Government” 223-224). Reza Shah also angered the masses of Iran 
by passing “legislation to benefit landlords at the expense of peasants” (Ghods, 
“Government” 226). M. Reza Ghods observes that while the reforms of Reza Shah did 
have some positive results, “in general, the gap between rich and poor widened” 
(“Government” 226). The actions of Muhammad Reza Shah, Reza Shah’s son and 
successor, continued his father’s trend of trusting and promoting certain “notables” at the 
expense of the general population (Martin 17). As his reign progressed, Muhammad 
Reza Shah became increasingly autocratic and ruled primarily “by decree” (Martin 21). 
Much of Muhammad Reza Shah’s (henceforth the Shah) decrees and reforms 
unsurprisingly resembled those of his father with emphasis placed on the military and 
land reform (Martin 20-21). The Shah’s land reforms ultimately backfired, creating a 
class of landless peasants that settled in Iran’s cities to find work (Martin 21). The Shah 
unpopularity was particularly evident in 1953 when he was effectively forced to flee Iran 
by a populist movement lead by Muhammad Mossadegh (1882-1967) (Mottahedeh, The 
Mantle 128). Mossadegh’s faction sought to liberate Iran from foreign influence by 
nationalizing Iran’s oil industry, a move that was very unpopular with the British who 
owned or controlled nearly every aspect of Iranian oil production (Mottahedeh 129). In 
response, the British persuaded the United States (who feared a communist takeover in 
Iran) to aid them in a coup to take down Mossadegh (Mottahedeh, The Mantle 129-130). 
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With financial support from Britain and the U.S. Mossadegh was overthrown, and the 
Shah was returned to Iran. 
What the Shah did succeed in doing was increasing the size and power of the 
military, and creating an expertly trained secret service known as SAVAK, which 
enabled him to crush most resistance to his rule (Martin 20). The agents of SAVAK were 
trained by the United State’s CIA and Israel’s Mossad and represented the Shah’s close 
relationship with both countries (Keddie 134). The Shah developed particularly close ties 
with the United States, whose desire for Iranian oil was matched by the Shah’s need for 
loans and modern weaponry (Keddie 136). The result of the rules of both Reza Shah and 
Muhammad Reza Shah was an Iran that catered to a few wealthy individuals and a large 
military while overlooking the rights and welfare of the middle and lower classes (Keddie 
135). Under Muhammad Reza Shah the influence and actions of his secret police 
(SAVAK) became so prevalent that a culture of repression and fear was so engendered in 
the Iranian subconscious that any “mysterious” violent acts were automatically attributed 
to SAVAK and, consequently, the Shah (Keddie 217). In the previous sections of this 
work much has been made about the link between chaotic social situations and the rise of 
charismatic figures. The previous paragraphs illustrate that Reza Shah and Muhammad 
Reza Shah perpetuated a militaristic-secularizing and, in the case of Muhammad Reza 
Shah, increasingly paranoid form of rule that literally left many Iranians in the dust. 
Although a few Iranians benefited from programs and reforms put in place by the Pahlavi 
Monarchs; most Iranians either noticed no difference in terms of their socio-economic 
position, or found themselves with a education (often from a American or European 
University) with limited employment opportunities and little or no way to express their 
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anger at the lack of social mobility (Keddie 149, 157). Eventually one member of the 
Shi’i ‘ulama in particular came to embody Iranian resentment towards the Shah, serving 
as the voice of the people and the will of God. 
While perusing his education in Qum, Khomeini bore witness to the reforms and 
policies of Reza Shah, and began writing as a member of Iran’s Shi’i ‘ulama under the 
reign of Muhammad Reza Shah (Martin 17). Although Khomeini developed into a 
revolutionary figure, he did not start off that way (Nasr 121). It was the “modernizing 
trends” ushered into Iran by foreigners and the Pahlavi Monarchs the ultimately changed 
Khomeini’s perspective, and set him on a course that changed the sociological, political, 
and religious structure of Iran (Nasr 121). In one of his early writings (circa 1940), 
Khomeini expands his view of what the nature and role of government should be. One 
section begins with the statement, “[w]hen a government does not perform its duty, it 
becomes oppressive” (Khomeini, Islam 169). Going further, Khomeini argues that, 
“[t]he only government that reason accepts as legitimate and welcomes freely and happily 
is the government of God” (Khomeini, Islam 170). In this early writing Khomeini 
doesn’t suggest that “government must be in the hands of the faqih [Islamic jurist],” but 
that Islamic law (shari’ah) should be implemented to create a more ideal form of 
government (Khomeini, Islam 170). As Brown notes, the primary theme in Khomeini’s 
writings is to establish that “Islam provides a comprehensive sociopolitical system valid 
for all time and place” (172). Khomeini even presents the court system set up by Reza 
Shah as an example of how a secular system is prone to corruption “and thousands of 
associated vices” (Islam 171). Shah Isma’il’s Shi’ite revolution made a Shi’i empire in a 
Shi’i majority state a reality in the face of a Sunni majority. The root of Khomeini’s 
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revolution is making a Shi’i government possible, where the power of the state is vested 
in the laws and will of God not the corrupt “monarchies and governments” of the world 
(Khomeini, Islam 169). 
Arjomand observes that the “climate of educated opinion” inherent in the political 
conditions of twentieth century Iran made Mahdist or “millenarian” claims difficult 
(“History” 113). ‘Ali Shari’ati, a “lay Islamic ideologue,” viewed the return (ra’ja) of 
the Twelfth Imam in terms of a social revolution for the “oppressed masses of the Third 
World” (Arjomand, “History” 113). Another opinion of the ra’ja, this time from a 
member of the Shi’i ‘ulama, Ayatollah Motahhari, presents the Mahdi’s return within its 
eschatological framework, but in within a more positive context as restoration of justice 
“and the true religion…of the perfect society… realized only at the end of the process of 
human evolution” (Arjomand, “History” 113). It will be shown that Khomeini’s 
revolution not only reflects the “educated” character of the twentieth century and his 
Madraseh education, but also a very subtle interpretation and embodiment of the doctrine 
regarding Twelfth Imam’s return (ra’ja). 
Khomeini did not himself make any specific Mahdist claims; however, he did not 
stop his supporters from referring to him as the prophesized Mahdi, becoming the first 
person that Iranians had referred to as the just Imam since the “sixteenth century” 
(Arjomand, “History” 113). Due either to Khomeini’s inability to stop his supporter’s 
claims or his acceptance of the Mahdist mantle, Khomeini began to exemplify the role of 
the Mahdi “in the popular imagination” of the Iranian people (Babayan, Mystics 491). 
Moreover, Khomeini made active use of what Arjomand calls a “Shi’ite Messianic 
yearning” in order to facilitate his revolution, drawing on the charisma inherent in the 
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Twelfth Imam’s return (ra’ja) (“History” 113). In Bashir’s analysis of the life and works 
of the fifteenth century claimant to the Mahdi, Muhammad Nurbakhsh, he notes the 
distinction between those who espoused Mahdist ideals and the scholarly activity of the 
‘ulama (“The Imams” 21). As noted above, Khomeini did not make the specific claim to 
being the Mahdi that Nurbakhsh and Shah Isma’il did; nevertheless, he projected a 
knowledge of the “truth” and a “saintly” aura that were historical attributes of the Mahdi 
(Bashir, “The Imams” 21). Presented in the terminology of Weber, Khomeini’s implied 
status as the Mahdi entitled him to access the charisma or “gift of grace” and the “specific 
gifts of the body and spirit” that were inherent in the Imami lineage (Weber 19, 47). 
According Vali Nasr, Khomeini represented “a drastically new kind of Shia leader, with a 
movement behind him that represented a major break in Shia history” (121). Khomeini 
had what Nasr describes as “a clear sense of destiny, his own, Shi’ism’s, and Iran’s” that 
suggest both the mission of the Mahdi and Weber’s “gifts” (Nasr 121). 
Khomeini’s flirtations with Mahdihood and the basis of his political philosophy 
are closely tied to his interest and study in ‘irfan or “mystical philosophy” (Martin 31). 
‘Irfan, according to Vanessa Martins, contains “the perception that all creation derives 
from the One, the eternal truth” or, in other words, God (31). Where ‘irfan differs from 
the “purely spiritual manifestation” found in Sufism is in the educated character of its 
authors and adherents (Martin 32-33). Thus, Khomeini was ascribed the title of a “sober 
mystic” due to his “withdrawn demeanor [and] inward-looking gaze,” as opposed to 
varied and extroverted practices often associated with Sufis or “drunken mystics” 
(Armstrong, Battle 249). ‘Irfan is rooted in the educational tradition of the Shi’i ‘ulama 
where philosophical and logical analysis are emphasized over the individual mystical 
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teachings and practices of a Sufi Shaykh (Martin 32). The works of certain philosophers 
such as the mystic Ibn al-Arabi and the Safavid era cleric-philosopher Mulla Sadra were 
especially popular among students of ‘irfan (Martin 32). Arjomand notes, however, that 
Khomeini’s interest in ‘irfan did not represent the majority interest of Iran’s Shi’i ‘ulama, 
many of whom viewed the study of ‘irfan as a gateway to “extremist” views (The Turban 
100). ‘Irfan’s “marginality” is due to “the possibility of millenarian interpretation of 
Shi’ism from its perspective, a possibility that had been realized by some claimants to 
Mahdihood” (Arjomand, The Turban 100). Because of the low view of ‘irfan held by 
most of the ‘ulama, Khomeini had to study it in secret and only really began to teach the 
subject once his position as a cleric of note was firmly established (Martin 32-33). 
In Khomeini’s case, it appears that Sadra’s work was of particular relevance, and 
helped foster an interest in “political questions” that had little to do with his “clerical 
career” (Armstrong, The Battle 228). In particular, Khomeini’s reading of Sadra and his 
general interest in ‘irfan influenced his revolutionary character and his subsequent 
“extension of Shi’ite tradition to the sphere of political culture and political organization” 
(Arjomand, The Turban 100). Armstrong writes that “[f]or Khomeini, as for Sadra, 
mysticism and politics were inseparable,” meaning there could be no great societal 
change without an attending “spiritual reformation” (Battle 248-249). Mullah Sadra in 
his work al-Asfar al-Arbach (The Four Journeys of the Soul) explains the “spiritual” 
process that prepares a leader to “begin [their] political mission” (Armstrong, Battle 56, 
249). There is evidence to suggest that by 1963, when Khomeini began to actively speak 
out against the Shah, that he completed the initial stages of Sadra’s process (Armstrong, 
Battle 249). Nasr provides a record of a meeting between the Medhi Haeri Yazdi (the 
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son of Khomeini’s teacher Ayatollah Ha’eri), after the Islamic Revolution that shows that 
Khomeini continued on his Sadra inspired journey to God late into his life (119). In an 
exchange that centered on the Muslim bloodshed in the Iran/Iraq war, the younger Haeri 
exclaimed that “[i]t is not right for Muslims to kill Muslims” and that many are “dying in 
a war that has no end and no good purpose” (qtd. in Nasr 120). Khomeini replied with 
the question, “Do you also criticize God when he sends an earthquake?” this question 
jarred Haeri with his “implicit comparison of himself to the Almighty” (qtd. in Nasr 120). 
For the younger Haeri, Khomeini’s admission to divine resemblance suggested that 
Khomeini had “embarked on the last leg of Sadra’s journey…[were he] could function as 
a virtually divine lawgiver” (Nasr 120). As a being in command of the “direct knowledge 
of the Truth,” Khomeini assumed the role of the Imam on Earth enabling him to 
revolutionize the application of certain Shi’i doctrines in way that had no real precedent 
in Shi’i history (Nasr 121). 
Some Iranians were frightened by Khomeini’s declarations because they called 
for the destruction of everything the Shah had built with no “constructive program” for a 
new government (Farman-Farmaian 294). Khomeini, however, appears to have had a 
well-conceived notion of how to rebuild Iranian society after the Shah was expelled, 
based on his mystical mission (Akhavi, “Contending” 229). Writing from Najaf, Iraq in 
1971 Khomeini stated “[i]t is our duty to work toward the establishment of an Islamic 
government” (Khomeini, Islam 126). Khomeini goes on to suggest how such a 
government could and should be constructed, placing a great deal of emphasis on the role 
of the Islamic jurist in educating the public about the all-inclusive nature of Islamic law 
(shari’ah) especially its extension to the “political, economic, and legal” aspects of life 
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(Khomeini, Islam 126-128). J.S. Ismael and T.Y. Ismael write that Khomeini’s political 
philosophy “reflects” the sum total of Islamic “inquiry into the nature and role of 
government” (601). Writing of the political function of the Friday prayer and practices 
such as jihad, Khomeini certainly references practices that hearken back at least to the 
Safavid period (Khomeini, Islam 130). Khomeini’s writings further abound with 
references to the political role of the Shi’i Imams and the Prophet and the failures of 
various Monarchs throughout Islam’s history (Khomeini, Islam 133-134). 
Even Khomeini’s advocacy for the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (vilayat-i faqih in 
Persian) or rule/guardianship of the jurisconsult is not without historical precedent 
(Akhavi, “Contending” 213). Vilayat-i faqih developed as a response to the occultation 
of the Twelfth Imam when the leadership of Shi’i community was left in the hands of the 
scholars and disciples of the Imams (Akhavi, “Contending” 231-232). It is in the scope 
of the implantation of vilayat-i faqih that Khomeini breaks with the traditional give and 
take found in societies relationship with Islam. Horstmann writes that certain aspects of 
“a routinized cannon can be revitalized [due to] the presence of the charismatic 
redeemer” (180). Horstmann asserts that the actions and proclamations of a charismatic 
figure can update or adapt a doctrine to fit their time period or situation (180). 
Khomeini’s doctrinal revitalization picked up steam in the 1960s and 1970s when he 
began to argue for the implementation of specific doctrine. (Khomeini 177-178). For 
Khomeini, vilayat-i faqih did not simply imply that an Islamic jurist was capable of being 
a judge or executor of Islamic law (shari’ah) but had the authority to effectively act as 
rulers because of their religious knowledge accumulated over years of study (Akhavi, 
“Contending” 238-239). Khomeini’s argument for such an application of vilayat-i faqih is 
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rooted in the logic that the laws and beliefs of Islam were not abrogated after the Twelfth 
Imam’s occultation because the proto-‘ulama were there to protect and preserve the 
traditions of the Prophets and Holy Imams (Khomeini, Islam 42). Although Khomeini’s 
logic was as sound as ever, Shahrough Akhavi writes that Khomeini had trouble 
quantifying his interpretation of vilayat-i faqih because of a lack of supporting Qur’anic 
verses and sunna accounts (“The Clergy’s” 100). 
Khomeini eventually found and modified a tradition attributed to the sixth Shi’i 
Imam that allowed Shi’i judges “to rule the Shiite community should the Imam not be 
available” in order to substantiate his concept of the rule of the jurist (Akhavi, “The 
Clergy’s” 100). Most commentary on the tradition from Imam Ja’far that Khomeini cited 
as justification for his expansion of vilayat-i faqih, argue that Imam Ja’far allows clerics 
to make rulings in the Imam’s absence only in “technical disputes over inheritance and 
debt” (Akhavi, “The Clergy’s” 100). It is a testament to Khomeini’s ingenuity and 
charisma that he was able to activate such a doctrine in the absence of extensive source 
material. For Khomeini, the Shi’i ‘ulama could command what P.E. Walker defines as 
the holding of “powers similar in many respects but not exactly equivalent to those of the 
Imams” (6:209). Brown suggests that Khomeini’s charisma and mystical character are 
central to the founding of the Islamic Republic and the implementation of vilayat-i faqih, 
arguing that they are based on “Khomeini’s assumptions about God’s plan for mankind 
and the ability of the just and learned faqih [Islamic jurist] to administer that plan” (172). 
The crux of Khomeini’s argument for the implementation of vilayat-i faqih is that “Islam 
provides a comprehensive sociopolitical system valid for all time and place,” and that 
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religious scholars are the most qualified to “implement God’s plan in this world” (Brown 
172). 
In 1963 Khomeini was arrested by SAVAK for speaking out against the Shah’s 
relationship with the United States and Israel, his undemocratic polices, and the 
increasingly depressed state of Iran’s poor (Armstrong, Battle 248). In the process of 
arresting Khomeini, SAVAK killed a number of students in Qum’s Fayziyah Madraseh 
where Khomeini was teaching (Armstrong, Battle 248). In this first instance, Khomeini 
was only jailed for a few days and then released only to be arrested again a few days later 
for denouncing the Shah in another speech (Armstrong, Battle 249-250). Khomeini’s 
second arrest led to massive protest in many of Iran’s cities, which were violently 
suppressed by SAVAK, illustrating the effect that Khomeini was beginning to have on 
the Iranian population (Armstrong, Battle 250). His second arrest also led to Khomeini 
being promoted to the rank of “Grand Ayatollah” in order to emphasize his position in 
Iran’s Shi’i ‘ulama, in addition to making it “too risky for the [Shah’s] regime to kill 
him” (Armstrong, Battle 250). The title of Ayatollah (Sign of God) is rank often ascribed 
to a prominent mujtahid (an expert on Shi’i law and doctrine) and 
Increasingly in the twentieth century prominent Ayatollahs were also referred to 
as a marja-i taqlid or model of emulation (Momen 204-205). A marja-i taqlid is 
someone who can be considered one of the “most learned” of the Shi’i, someone that 
lesser Shi’i clerics (Mullahs in the case of Iran) looked to both for leadership and as a 
reference point for dealing with legal and theological questions beyond their abilities 
(Momen 205). Ahmed Kazemi Moussavi further describes the requirements for being a 
marja-i taqlid writing that a marja, “has to be learned in Arabic, logic, theology…and 
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jurisprudence,” in addition to being held in high esteem by “reputable” members of the 
Shi’i ‘ulama (44). 
There have only been a few marjas during the entire history of the Shi’i, roughly 
one per century since the occultation of the Twelfth Imam (Momen 206). Naturally, the 
Prophet and the Twelve Shi’i Imams served as the marja-i taqlids during their lifetimes 
(Momen 206). The death of a marja often resulted in a number of spirited exchanges 
between various mujtahids vying for the position (Walbridge 5). Such a case arose in 
Iran after the death of Ayatollah Burujirdi in 1961 left a leadership vacuum at an 
important junction in Iran’s history (Walbridge 5). After Burujirdi death, many of the 
Shi’i in Iran turned to Khomeini as their new marja-i taqlid even though “he was not the 
most learned of the mujtahids of his time” (Walbridge 5). Walbridge writes that it is 
unlikely that Khomeini would have been considered for the rank of marja “had it not 
been for his stance against the shah and his leadership in the revolution” (5). Moreover, 
if not for the chaotic circumstances in Iran it is likely that Khomeini would have been 
“outshone” by the “scholarly achievement” of his peers (Walbridge 5). Although 
Khomeini did not become the sole marja for the whole of the Shi’i community after the 
death of Ayatollah Burujirdi, as evident in Iraq where the Shi’i turned to the leadership of 
Ayatollah Khu’i (Walbridge 5). For Iran, however, Khomeini was regarded as the 
Marja’iyat al-taqlid al-tamm, or the sole source of emulation for one community 
(Walbridge 4-5). 
Khomeini’s ability to rise to rank of marja over other mujtahids who were 
perhaps more qualified in the traditional sense suggests that his charismatic appeal to the 
masses overrode the tenets of tradition. Walbridge notes that, “a strong marja can be a 
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powerful unifying force,” as his words and actions (for the Shi’i) serve as the “final word 
on a issue” (4). The mystical Mahdi-like appeal of Khomeini coupled with his ascension 
to the role of the sole point of emulation for the bulk of Iran’s Shi’i made Khomeini a 
marja-i taqlid par excellence. The esoteric charm of Khomeini for Iranians was rooted in 
his exile. Like the Hidden Imam, Khomeini was elsewhere; cut off from direct contact 
with his disciples yet still able to supply them with hope and guidance from afar. 
Khomeini’s Mahdist aura enabled him to speak on affairs as both an expert on Shi’i 
doctrine, but also as a creator or source of doctrine the most revolutionary being his 
recasting of vilayat-i faqih. In Khomeini the Shi’i of Iran saw someone who could 
liberate them from the tyranny and disenfranchisement imposed by the Pahlavi 
monarchy, and usher in a sort of religious utopia where the masses would no longer be 
deprived of life’s necessities. 
It was in Khomeini’s rhetoric, and the Iranian people’s reaction to Khomeini’s 
rhetoric in the 1960s and 1970s, that the charismatic power of the Mahdi-marja is 
evident. By drawing on the significance associated with the Mahdi’s return Khomeini 
could command more influence on Iran’s Shi’i then other clerics. The power of 
Khomeini’s visage and message is further emphasized by the fact that he spent the 
majority of the 1960s and 1970s in exile (Moin 127-129). The invention and wide use of 
cassette tape players in Iran made Khomeini’s exile (first to Turkey and Iraq and finally 
to Paris) almost a non-issue as his speeches against the Shah’s regime were easily 
smuggled into Iran where they were copied and passed around (Farman-Farmaian 293-
294). If anything, Khomeini’s speeches became more inflammatory in exile and were rife 
with Shi’i imagery. In one speech given in Najaf in the early 1970s Khomeini wrote that 
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“[t]he greatest disaster that befell Islam was the usurpation of rule by Mu’awiya [the first 
Umayyad Caliph] from ‘Ali…which caused the system of rule to lose it Islamic character 
entirely and to be replaced by a monarchical regime” (Khomeini, Islam 200). In the 
previous statement Khomeini eloquently equates monarchal rule with the despotism that 
unseated ‘Ali from his rightful place as the leader of the Muslim community (ummah) 
after the Prophet’s death, thus insinuating that the Shi’ah and monarchal rule have been 
antithetical since their inception in the Islamic context. Khomeini also allegorically 
referenced the tragedy of the martyrdom of Husayn (the third Shi’i Imam) in many of his 
speeches. In a speech given on ‘Ashura (the date commemorating the martyrdom of 
Husayn) Khomeini compared the Umayyad Caliph Yazid’s hatred of Husayn and the 
family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt) with the Shah’s loathing not just of the ‘ulama but of 
Islam and all of its practitioners (Khomeini, Islam 177). Kamran Scot Aghaie observes 
that the Karbala tragedy lent itself quite naturally to use as a model for speaking out 
against the Shah, particularly if there had been deaths at the hands of the Shah’s forces 
(78-79). Khomeini’s rhetoric regarding Karbala evolved into an apocalyptically themed 
struggle; a grand ta’ziyeh (passion play depicting the martyrdom of Husayn) with the 
Shah playing the part of the vile Yazid and Khomeini and the Iranian people being 
presented as Husayn and his heroic companions (Aghaie 79-80). The outcome of such a 
production was an outpouring of protest against the Shah that negated even the strength 
of the American armed Iranian army and the violence of SAVAK (Farman-Farmaian 
289-290). 
Tucker’s notion of a “charismatic phenomenon” in which charismatic leaders and 
“charismatic movements” become “inseparable” help to quantify the nature and outcome 
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of the Iran’s Islamic Revolution (qtd. in Sanders 26). In his speeches, Khomeini often 
called on the people of Iran to protest the Shah’s regime and policies. In one speech in 
particular, Khomeini called on the ‘ulama to “remove the endorsements of their silence” 
and speak out against the Shah knowing that the Shah couldn’t imprison them all 
(Khomeini, Islam 205). As the 1970s wore on, Iran was host to a great number of 
demonstrations, especially in urban centers (Keddie 232-233). 
For some, however, arguments based on Khomeini’s charismatic subtext (or any 
number of other arguments for that matter) as the cause of the Iran’s Islamic revolution 
are not convincing (Parsa xi-xii). Misagh Parsa, for example, argues that the Iranian 
Revolution was not the result of Shi’ite messianic leanings or Husaynid cycles of 
mourning and martyrdom led by a charismatic Imam, but conflict between “state 
economic polices” and certain social groups following a trend seen “in revolutionary 
movements in the Third World” (8-10). Economic and social concerns certainly played a 
role in the revolution as many Iranians went on strike during the revolution effectively 
shutting down oil production and large segments of the economy (Keddie 233). 
Furthermore, there were many fringe groups made up of intellectuals, out-of-work 
students, and angry bazaaris (traditional shopkeepers and crafts-guild leaders) who, in 
their collective anger, joined up with the ‘ulama against the Shah (Arjomand, The Turban 
106-107). 
The appeal of Khomeini cannot be underestimated as Arjomand notes that the 
throngs of migrants into Iran’s cities had no real social ties, but were especially 
susceptible to “Islamic revolutionary ideology” (The Turban 107). The widespread 
nature of the protest and Khomeini’s ability to appeal to groups as disparate as 
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leftist/communist student groups and seminary students in Qum suggests that there was a 
charismatic overtone to the revolution. There was arguably something inherent in 
Khomeini’s tenacity and his ability to belittle the Shah and his military that captivated 
many in Iran regardless of their station and political belief (Arjomand, The Turban 101-
102). The singularly of Khomeini’s purpose (establishing an Islamic government) and 
his rejection of “experts” in dealing with hostages in the U.S. Embassy at least presents 
Khomeini as a man who is privy to special knowledge (‘ilm) that parallels Weber’s 
conception of a charismatic-prophetic figure (Arjomand, The Turban 102). It should be 
noted that in the aftermath of the revolution that many people in the leftist-militant camps 
who had supported Khomeini as the leader of the revolution did not support his idea for a 
new government (Arjomand, The Turban 138). After the Shah was deposed, Khomeini 
denounced many of his former supporters as “lackeys of the West,” setting the stage for a 
clerical crackdown on “counterrevolutionary activities” (Arjomand, The Turban 138). 
Nevertheless, 1978 in particular saw the rise in “grassroots organization of 
Khomeini supporters” and a public that was “increasingly fearless, enthusiastic, and 
aroused, even in the face of deaths in demonstrations” (Keddie 233). In 1978 Khomeini 
called on the people of Iran to “break open the chains of slavery! One after another, 
remove the treacherous pawns of the Shah from the scene [and] Make firm your ranks, 
strengthen your resolve, preserve your unity of purpose, and join together with all 
Muslim elements” (Khomeini, Islam 239). The previously mentioned statement, along 
with many others by Khomeini, drove many Iranians to extremes at the behest of a 
religious leader suggests something more than a revolt against the Shah’s economic 
polices. Moreover, on 11 December 1978 during a massive ‘Ashura celebration/protest 
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the effect of the Khomeini’s charismatic phenomenon was realized when “a resolution 
was passed asking Khomeini to lead Iran and calling on Iranians to struggle until the shah 
was overthrown” (Keddie 234). By the end of 1978 the Shah had fled Iran and Khomeini 
made his triumphant return to Iran in February 1979 (Keddie 234-235). Even the Shah’s 
powerful allies like the United States eventually realized that there “was no feasible way 
to stop the Khomeini movement” (Keddie 235-236). 
Although there were many popular sayings that came to characterize the 
revolution in Iran, none captured both the significance of Khomeini’s role in the 
revolution and the tone of things to come than Shah raft, Imam amad (The Shah has 
gone, the Imam has come) (Arjomand, The Turban 104). As the “Imam” of the 
revolution, Khomeini was able to command far more charismatic authority than his 
predecessors, and as the mystical marja was able to inject his version of vilayat-i faqih 
onto the Iranian political sphere. For Iran, Imam Khomeini (as he was popularly called 
after the revolution) was the just Imam returned with all the significance that this title 
implied. After the departure of the Shah and the success of the revolution many of the 
revolutionary elements came together in an attempt to form a new government. When 
the dust finally settled, it was Khomeini and a “clerically dominated Revolutionary 
Council” that had gained control of the political establishment (Arjomand, The Turban 
139). The principal thrust of Iran’s new clerical government was, unsurprisingly, putting 
on paper the “extensive governmental power” of the jurist (Arjomand, The Turban 139). 
Khomeini’s founding of a government in which the Shi’i jurist was given precedence 
marks the culmination of his Shi’ite revolution. The second article of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s constitution contains two points that illustrate Khomeini’s success. 
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First, is the notion that the Islamic Republic’s government was vitally based on the 
“belief in the One God…[and] divine revelation and its fundamental role in the 
expounding of laws” (Constitution 26). Second, is the basis and need for the “continuous 
ijtihad (legal reasoning) of the fuqaha (Islamic jurist)” in order to lead Iran’s new 
government (Constitution 27). Shah Isma’il had made a Shi’i Iran possible, but it was 
not until Imam Khomeini returned to Iran from his occultation in Paris, and realized his 
vision of a “Government of God” that a Shi’i government led by the deputies “of the 
Holy Imams” was enacted (Arjomand, The Turban 139). 
Henderson 93 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY ON EVENTS IN CONTEMPORARY 
IRAN 
In July of 2009, Iranian cleric and politician, ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
(b.1934), read a speech that called for the release of a number of political prisoners, and 
even “challenged the authority of the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei 
(b. 1939)” (Sciolino 1). Rafsanjani’s speech was a response to the Iranian government’s 
crackdown after the massive protests that erupted after a disputed Presidential election in 
June of 2009 (Sciolino 1). The protests began after the incumbent, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad (b. 1956) was declared the winner of the Presidential election over the 
reform candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi (b. 1942) amid cries of election fraud (The New 
York Times 1). Moussavi’s supporters contended that the government headed by 
Ayatollah Khamenei “stole” the election in order to keep Ahmadinejad in office (The 
New York Times 1). Moussavi’s supporters and members of the opposition parties felt 
that Ahmadinejad and his regime were against democratic reform and the development of 
polices that would make Iran less antagonistic to the West (The New York Times 1). In 
response to the protest, Khamenei’s government sent out security forces and activated the 
“pro-government” Basij militia to violently disperse and arrest members of the 
opposition, consequentially creating a very tense political situation in Iran (The New 
York Times 1). 
In an attempt to smooth over relations with the public, and still appeal to the 
clerical powers, Rafsanjani referenced his relationship with his political “mentor,” and 
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the Islamic Republic’s founder Ayatollah Khomeini who, according to Rafsanjani, 
always believed in the primacy of the will of the people (Sciolino 1). Elaine Sciolino 
writes that “[b]ehind the words” of Rafsanjani’s speech was an attempt to state that “for 
the Islamic Republic to survive, it must restore its legitimacy, reaffirm its republican 
institutions and find a formula for governing” (1). Khamenei’s actions, or blunders 
depending on the interpretation, do not appear to have sustained the Islamic Republic in 
the same revolutionary spirit that characterized the rule of his predecessor (Cohen 10). 
Op-Ed Columnist Roger Cohen writes that Khamenei’s violent suppression of the 
election protestors ultimately weakened Khamenei’s (and therefore the Iranian 
government’s) authority and deprived him of his “aura” (10). 
In the thirty years since Khomeini returned to Iran as the Imam of the Revolution 
and established the Islamic Republic, Iran has never encountered such dissent (The New 
York Times 1). A significant portion of this work has concerned itself with the 
application and effect of charismatic Shi’i leadership on the Iranian religious and political 
sphere. Previous chapters have established the Shi’i Imams as charismatic figures who 
were part of a charismatic office that extended until the Twelfth Imam entered a period of 
esoteric hiding in the 9th century C.E.. This work then turned to two figures, Shah Isma’il 
ibn Haydar and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in order to argue that the suspended 
charisma of the Shi’i Imams could be tapped by certain individuals in order to bring 
about Shi’ite revolutions. The purpose of the final section of this work is twofold: first, 
to demonstrate that events in Iran after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini illustrate 
Weberian models of charismatic routinization, and second to argue that the protests 
stemming from the June 2009 Presidential election, while significant in their own right, 
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do not herald a third Iranian Shi’ite revolution. The process for arguing both points will 
also serve as a vehicle for general conclusions to this work as a whole. 
Khomeini, while not actively involved in the creation of the Islamic Republic’s 
government, was nevertheless very import in shaping the political aspects of the Iran’s 
new regime (Arjomand, After Khomeini 30-31). The creation of the office of the 
supreme leader or “Supreme jurist” serves as a good example of Khomeini’s influence. 
Members of the Shi’i ‘ulama permeated almost every aspect of the Iran’s new 
government, serving both in the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Guardian 
Council (Arjomand, After Khomeini 30-31). Reaching a consensus in the political world, 
much like reaching a concrete opinion in religious matters, proved difficult. In order to 
overturn rulings or force some aspects of law through, many of Iran’s politicians went to 
Khomeini (the Imam of the Revolution) in the hope that he would side with them and 
allot some of his authority to their project (Arjomand, After Khomeini 31). From his 
position, Khomeini was disconnected enough from the government to maintain his pious 
image, but was still able influence the direction and tone of the Islamic Republic’s 
political rulings. Khomeini’s creation of various committees and sub-committees to 
implement his will near the end of life illustrates his indirect involvement in the sundry 
business of politics (Arjomand, After Khomeini 34-35). The point of investigating 
Khomeini’s political endeavors after the establishment of the Islamic Republic is to show 
that he was still functioning as a charismatic-Shi’i figure, serving as the model of 
emulation (marja-i taqlid) for the Iranian government. 
Also during this time, Khomeini began to tone down whatever messianic or 
divine claims that he may have embraced in the years leading up to the revolution as 
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evident in his poetry (Khomeini and Hanaway 274). Although Khomeini wrote poetry 
throughout his life, joining “Shah Isma’il, Naser al-Din Shah and numerous other rulers 
of Persia who have written poetry,” the poetry composed in his final years suggests a 
deep longing for the divine presence that he once embraced (Khomeini and Hanaway 
274). One poem in particular illustrates Khomeini’s desire for the divine beginning: 
My life has reached its end and still my beloved has not come, my tale has 
ended but an end to this heartache has not come. Have in hand death's cup 
but have never seen a cup of wine, years have passed but a favor from my 
darling has not come. The bird that is my soul no longer flutters in this cage, 
and the one who would break its bars has not come (Khomeini and Hanaway 
274). 
Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, leaving Iran with “a relatively strong government” 
constructed on his revolutionary Shi’i principals and elaborated Shi’i doctrines (Keddie 
262). According to Rafsanjani (who was serving as President at the time) he had 
designated ‘Ali Khamenei to serve as the Supreme Leader after his death (Arjomand, 
After Khomeini 36). 
In designating a successor, Khomeini effectively routinized his charisma into the 
office of the Supreme Leader, creating what Arjomand calls, “post-charismatic, collective 
clerical rule” (After Khomeini 37). Further evidence for the routinization of Khomeini’s 
charisma is seen in Khamenei’s inheritance of all of Khomeini’s “political titles…except 
for ‘Imam’” (Arjomand, After Khomeini 36). The power of Khomeini’s designation is 
also evident in his choice of Khamenei, because Khamenei was not a marja-i taqlid and 
therefore not technically allowed to assume the position of Supreme Leader according to 
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the Islamic Republic’s Constitution (Arjomand, After Khomeini 36-37). Khamenei’s 
assent also marked a partnership with President Hashemi Rafsanjani, in which the focus 
of the Islamic Republic’s government turned away from strictly religious matters and 
began to focus on “economic reconstruction” and “foreign relations” (Keddie 263). 
Although the efforts of Khamenei and Rafsanjani did improve Iran’s economy and its 
station in the world to some degree, many Iranians were dissatisfied with the domestic 
situation and its lack of certain freedoms (Keddie 263). Khamenei lacked the religious 
qualifications and revolutionary spirit that had been crucial aspects of Khomeini’s rule, 
and thus sought to cultivate support within the “revolutionary institutions (especially the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards)” that had supported Khomeini (Keddie 263-264). 
Moreover, Khamenei funded public works that made Iran’s revolutionary-Shi’i identity 
part of the Iranian landscape (Keddie 264). 
The charismatic-Shi’i aura of Khomeini is also contained and routinized in the 
monumental tomb constructed after his death. Khomeini’s tomb, according to Kishwar 
Rizvi, serves as a “commemorative monument built to honor both the man buried in it 
and the revolution he inspired” (209). Incorporating aspects of “Shi’i iconography” 
within a structure based both on modern Iranian structures and the tombs of Shi’i holy 
figures, Khomeini’s tomb stands as a reminder of Khomeini’s ability to merge the 
modern with the traditional (Rizvi 209). With minarets and gilded dome and surrounded 
by a cemetery for victims of the Iran-Iraq war the tomb of Khomeini is an impressive 
landmark on the road that fittingly links Tehran to the seminary city of Qum where 
Khomeini began his religious education in earnest (Rizvi 210-214). Rizvi sums ups the 
importance of Khomeini’s tomb nicely, writing “It [Khomeini’s tomb] is both a civic 
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monument and a popular pilgrimage site, both a symbol of the state and a religious 
edifice imbued with a highly charged mystical ethos emanating from the Shi’i belief in 
the Imamate” (210). Essentially, Khomeini’s tomb serves as a physical representation of 
Khomeini’s revolutionary spirit and charisma. A visitor to the tomb is not simply 
reminded of the life of great and holy man, but is confronted with imaginary that speaks 
both to the power and message of Shi’ism and its relationship with the Iranian revolution 
(Rizvi 212). Von Stietencron describes a phenomenon in which an object can take on a 
charismatic purpose even though doing so admittedly “extend[s] the concept of charisma 
into a domain that Weber did not envision” (25). Nevertheless, Von Stietencron’s 
categorization is applicable to Khomeini’s tomb because of the nature of its construction 
and imagery. For Iran’s Shi’i, Khomeini’s tomb both literally and figuratively stand as a 
glowing beacon on the horizon reminding them of the power and significance attached to 
Khomeini and the revolution that his fostered. 
Iran’s Presidential election of 1997 in which Muhammad Khatami, a reform-
minded cleric, was elected even though the Supreme Leader (Khamenei) endorsed his 
rival, is often used to delineate a new phase in the Islamic Republic’s post-Khomeini 
political development (Keddie 269). Khatami was a supporter of Khomeini, but spent 
most of the 1980s and 1990s working in Islamic Centers in Europe and in Iran, in 
addition to writing extensively on how to “reconcile Islam and liberal democracy” 
(Keddie 269). Khatami’s struggle to find balance between Islamic government and 
democracy in his Presidency brought many of Iran’s political divisions to the forefront 
(Gheissari and Nasr 147-148). The Presidential elections of 2005 continued the trend set 
by the elections of 1997, proving to be a very provocative expression of the Iranian 
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peoples will (Gheissari and Nasr 148). While the 2005 election ushered in the Presidency 
of conservative and former revolutionary guard Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the election 
process itself was full of “intense debates over various conceptions of government and 
social organization, economic development, and foreign policy” (Gheissari and Nasr 
148). 
The political development of the Islamic Republic is not directly relevant to this 
work, but the fact that the Islamic Republic endured and continued to develop after the 
death of the charismatic Khomeini is. There has only been one other Supreme Leader 
since Khomeini (Khamenei) at the time of this writing, but there have been numerous 
Presidential elections that have showcased (to a degree) the democratic elements in the 
Islamic Republic. Even within the Presidential election, however, the clerical 
establishment has a great deal of say in choosing the leadership of the Islamic Republic. 
The Council of Guardians, for example, in the 2005 election narrowed down a “list of 
1,014” individuals to six “acceptable” candidates (Gheissari and Nasr 150). For the 
Islamic Republic, charisma was no longer really a factor in determining leadership 
ability. If anyone wanted to run for President they had to first pass a clerical inspection 
before they could even present themselves to the public. It should also be pointed out 
that most of the candidates who were running for President were either mainstays of the 
Islamic Republic since its inception or the protégés of such individuals (Gheissari and 
Nasr 150). What the effect of this system means is that each election, regardless of 
swings towards liberalism/reform or conservativism/crackdown, worked within the 
framework and constitution established at Khomeini’s behest. 
The harsh screening processes and nepotism involved in the selection of Iran’s 
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Presidential candidates contribute to either Nasr’s notion that the “Islamic revolution 
is…a spent force in Iran, and the Islamic Republic is a tired dictatorship facing pressures 
to change” (212). Conversely, there are notions that the Islamic Republic a vibrant 
political arena where liberal and conservative forces engage in partisan give and take 
with each election within the scope of clerical review (Gheissari and Sanandaji 277). 
Nasr, who views the Islamic Republic as being depleted legitimacy nevertheless 
acknowledges, “a sizeable share of the [Iranian] populace…still puts its trust in Khomeini 
and his legacy” even while it “continues to languish under the Islamic Republic” (212). 
If Nasr’s analysis is considered, then it appears that the Islamic Republic is maintained by 
the memory of Khomeini and his charismatic visage. Iran it seems has not completely 
devolved into what Lisa Wedeen in her analysis of Syria under Hafez al-Assad, calls a 
“noncharismatic authoritarian regime” (6). Wedeen’s noncharismatic regimes are 
characterized by an emphasis on “rhetoric and symbols” over (unsurprisingly) 
charismatic authority (6). In the case of Syria, symbols often took to the form of large 
organized spectacles that reinforced the regime’s perception of itself, while integrating 
the public in a way that “substantiated” power of the reigime (Wedeen 21). The rhetoric 
of Assad’s Syria often contained “familiar metaphors” in which Assad was painted as a 
father figure for all of Syria, and a creation and implementation of a sort of national 
discourse that constantly glorified the regime and its goals regardless of actual public 
opinion (Wedeen 58-60, 70-71). 
The Islamic Republic of Iran certainly developed and maintains a penchant for 
spectacle, especially spectacles that reinforce the Islamic purity of the regime while 
denouncing the actions of the West and the former allies of the Shah. The rhetoric of 
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Iran, however, was focused on perpetuating the revolutionary spirit making it, in 
Khamenei’s words, a “struggle of the generations” (Arjomand, After Khomeini 177). 
The extension of Khomeini’s revolution to a point outside of time effectively extended 
Khomeini’s brand of charismatic Shi’ism to the perceived final Shi’ite revolution marked 
by the return of the Twelfth Imam. The extension of the charisma of the revolution to 
days unknown secures the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic through a sort of continual 
routinization or “worldly-messianism” that allows Iran to function as a player and 
advocate for Muslims on the international stage in the absence of the Mahdi (Maghen 
255). 
Article five of the Islamic Republic’s constitution begins by stating that during the 
occultation of the Twelfth Imam or the “Lord of the Age,” then the power of “governance 
and leadership” should lie in the hands of the Shi’i ‘ulama (Constitution 29). Included in 
the article’s introduction is common Shi’i statement that often follows the mention of the 
Twelfth Imam, “may God hasten his renewed manifestation” (Constitution 29). In 
essence, the Shi’i jurist will have political power over anyone in Iran save the Twelfth 
Imam upon his return (ra’ja), and thus, there can be no further Shi’ite revolutions, in the 
Iranian context, until his return. For some, this assertion may seem outrageous, as there 
is no guarantee that the Twelfth Imam will return in the near or even distant future. 
Conversely, however, this study has shown that figure can directly, in the case of Shah 
Isma’il, or indirectly, in the instance of Ayatollah Khomeini, come to embody the spirit 
of the Twelfth Imam, and take advantage of the charisma inherent in the line of Shi’i 
Imams to bring about significant social and religious transformations. 
Although the protest that arose after the June 2009 Presidential election could be 
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interpreted as the chaos that will herald the Mahdi’s return (ra’ja), there have not been 
any individuals who have made any direct or indirect Mahdist claims (Momen 168-169). 
This is not to say that member of the “Green” or “Reform” movement has evoked no 
Shi’i symbols in their protest. Mir Hussein Moussavi’s willingness to be martyred in the 
name of the reform movement serves as a good example because of the significance 
associated martyrdom in Shi’ism in addition to playing on his namesakes famous last 
stand and his Moussavi (Husyanid) lineage (The New York Times 1). Even with such a 
powerful statement it still must be noted that Moussavi was part of the governmental 
establishment under Khomeini where he served as Prime Minister (Arjomand, After 
Khomeini 92). Moreover, Moussavi as a valid Presidential candidate in 2009 must have 
passed the clerical review needed by all candidates in order to run. Moussavi’s reform 
movement is essentially just that-a movement that does not seek to overthrow or 
revolutionize the Islamic-clerical regime, but to reform the current system and make it 
more democratic. Furthermore, the reform movement has yet to make any appeal to the 
“messianic yearning” present in Twelver Shi’ism (Arjomand, “History” 113). 
Paradoxically, it is the current Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has 
shown a great deal of interest in the Twelfth Imam. Ahmadinejad has not only set aside 
money for projects to build up the structures around the well of Jamkaran from which it is 
believed the Twelfth Imam will return, but also claims to feel “the presence of the Hidden 
Imam” at certain times (Arjomand, After Khomeini 156). Ze’ev Maghen notes that while 
Ahmadinejad’s references and interest in the Twelfth Imam have “not gone too far,” or to 
the point where he claims the Imam’s presence within himself, nevertheless, his popular 
religious interests are still not as in line with his clerical supporters as previous believed 
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(254). The question for the future of Iran, and Iranian Shi’ism is whether or not the 
charisma of the Imam is even accessible anymore. Moreover, is their even room in the 
Islamic Republic for the Mahdi, or has the “rationalist project,” or the orthodox aspects of 
Twelver Shi’ism “succeeded in severing the holy from the human” (Babayan, Mystics 
496). If anything, this work represents the power that an individual can gain not from 
breaking with the divine, but by fully embracing it. The heart of the Shi’i movement is a 
belief in the genealogical right, and extraordinary skills of a group of individuals who 
represented a continuation of the revelations that had changed their lives. And as long as 
the Twelfth Imam remains unseen, then the grace of the Imams is open to those who seek 
to change that which seems impossible. 
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